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In the last decade, statutory interpretation has reemerged as an im-
portant topic of academic theory and discussion.' This development is
welcome, since few topics are more relevant to legal craft and educa-
tion than the interpretation of statutes, now our primary source of law.
The recent theoretical views, however, contrast with practicing lawyers'
strategies of statutory interpretation. When practitioners give advice to
clients about what a statute means, their approach is usually eclectic:
They look at the text of the relevant statutory provisions, any legislative
history that is available, the context in which the legislation was en-
acted, the overall legal landscape, and the lessons of common sense
and good policy. But when law professors talk about statutory interpre-
tation, they tend to posit a more abstract, "grand" theory that privi-
leges one or another of these approaches as "foundational."' 2 The
commentators' grand theories contrast with the more ad hoc, fact-
based reasoning of the practicing lawyer.
How do judges interpret statutes? How should they? Many com-
mentators argue that judicial interpretation is, or at least ought to be,
inspired by grand theory. We think these commentators are wrong,
both descriptively and normatively: Judges' approaches to statutory in-
terpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any grand theory,
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I. See WILLIAN N. ESERIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 569-635 (1988), for an exposition and
critique of the leading theories of statutory interpretation.
2. By "foundational" approach, we mean a theory that identifies a single primary legiti-
mate source of interpretation-for example, the statutory text or legislative intent-and ad-
heres to the statutory meaning that source suggests, regardless of the circumstances or
consequences. The idea is related to, but is not the same as, philosophical "foundational-
ism," which argues that epistemology can provide a single analytical foundation for formulat-
ing unassailably certain beliefs. See, e.g., ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM AND PRACTICAL REASONING:
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HERMENEUTICS AND ANALYSIS (E. Simpson ed. 1987); RICHARD
RoRTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
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and this is a good methodology. Stated another way, we argue that
foundationalism is a flawed strategy for theorizing about statutory in-
terpretation and that a more modest approach, grounded upon "practi-
cal reason,"'3 is both more natural and more useful.
Our argument proceeds in three parts. Using three noteworthy
Supreme Court cases as examples, Part I argues that the three main
unitary theories of statutory interpretation-emphasizing legislative in-
tent, purpose, and text-all fail to establish an overriding and "objec-
tive" foundation for interpreting statutes. These theories share several
common weaknesses. First, each rests upon questionable premises
about the nature of interpretation and the legislative process. Second,
none can systematically produce determinate results in the "hard
cases," which undermines their claims to "objectivity." Third,
although each theory rests upon and subserves important values that
should be considered when interpreting statutes, no theory persuades
us that its cluster of underlying values is so important as to exclude all
others. An overall difficulty of grand theory is its emphasis on the uni-
versal over the particular, its failure to recognize that statutory inter-
pretation will work in different ways in different concrete cases.
Given the difficulties of the grand theories, one might be tempted to
abandon theory entirely, and relegate statutory interpretation to pure
ad hocism. This is not the approach we urge, because we find an un-
derlying coherence in the Supreme Court's practices of statutory inter-
pretation. In Part II, we suggest a paradigm describing the structure of
practical reasoning by which the Court interprets statutes in concrete
cases. According to this model, the Court considers a broad range of
textual, historical, and evolutive evidence when it interprets statutes.
In the easy cases, most of the evidence points in the same direction and
3. By "practical reason," we mean an approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor
of a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the practice of the common law),
seeking contextual justification for the best legal answer among the potential alternatives. For
a more extended explanation, see text accompanying notes 94-150 infra; Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1645-56
(1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason]; Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of
Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 837-58 (1988) [hereinafter Posner, Skepticism]; see also Daniel
A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1341-49 (1988).
Some of the recent literature about statutory interpretation is moving away from unitary
approaches toward more eclectic ones. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987) (attacking the view that statutory interpretation is
always a search for original legislative intent or purpose); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988) (attacking the view that statutory
interpretation must focus only on the statutory text) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Legislative
Intent]; William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
541 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179 (1986-87) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Fonnalism].
Our project obviously parallels recent thinking in constitutional law that questions the
foundationalist strategy. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional
Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theor, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987); Farber, supra;
Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason, supra; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regu-
lation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983).
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is thereby mutually reinforcing. In the hard cases, however, the evi-
dence points in different directions, and the Court critically analyzes
each textual or historical or evolutive argument, both as to its own co-
gency and as to its cogency in light of the other evidence. Is the text
clear on its face? Am I sure about that interpretation in light of Con-
gress's historical expectations? Does the text shed light on those ex-
pectations, perhaps by suggesting that certain speeches on the floor of
Congress did not represent prevailing attitudes? And so on. We seek
to capture much of this analysis through a schematic model of practical
reasoning, which seems to describe what the Court actually does when it
interprets a statute.
The philosophical inspiration for our model is Aristotle's theory of
practical reasoning (phronesis). Aristotle's practical philosophy starts
with the proposition that one can determine what is right in specific
cases, even without a universal theory of what is right.4 The Aristote-
lian concept ofphronesis has inspired a good deal of modern philosophy
of meaning, including the two schools that have provided us with the
inspiration and normative justifications for our model. One is the mod-
em hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who replaces the tradi-
tional metaphor of interpretation, according to which a subject
retrieves meaning from an object, with an interactive theory: Interpre-
tation, Gadamer claims, is the search for common ground between in-
terpreter and text. 5 The other tradition is American pragmatism, which
began with Charles Sanders Peirce's and WilliamJames's attacks on the
foundationalist philosophy of Descartes and Kant, 6 and which philoso-
phers such as Richard Rorty7 and Richard Bernstein8 have continued in
recent years. Both the hermeneutical and pragmatic traditions empha-
size themes of Aristotelian practical reasoning-the concrete situated-
ness of the interpretive enterprise, which militates against overarching
theories; the complexity of interpretation and argument, which recog-
4. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, chs. 5-11 (H. Rackham trans. 1962); see RON-
ALD BEINER, POLITICALJUDGMENT 72-82 (1983).
5. HANs-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge trans. 1976); HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, THE IDEA OF THE GOOD IN PLATONIC-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY (C. Smith
trans. 1986); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (G. Barden &J. Cumming trans. 2d
ed. 1975). Leading secondary works are GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADI-
TION AND REASON (1987); JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF
Truth and Method (1985); FrancisJ. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Pro-
posed M1odel of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Haberias, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U.L. REV. 523
(1988). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadarner/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
(1990) (forthcoming).
6. CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, 5 COLLECTED PAPERS (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss eds. 1960);
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE (J. Bochler ed. 1940); WILLIAM
JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (1907).
7. RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); R. RORTY, supra note 2.
8. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEU-
TICS, AND PRAXIS (1983) [hereinafter R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJEcTIVISM]; RICHARDJ. BERN-
STEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES: ESSAYS IN A PRAGMATIC MODE 58-114 (1986) [hereinafter R.
BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPIIICAL PROFILES].
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nizes that different values will pull the interpreter in different direc-
tions; and the importance of workable resolutions to complex
questions. As we argue in Part II, these traditions suggest the approach
we describe.
Moreover, we contend in Part III, these traditions and our model of
practical reasoning offer methods and criteria for criticizing the Court's
approach. In some cases, we claim, the Court distorts some of the in-
terpretive factors or appears to ignore or minimize relevant evolutive
factors, in an attempt to make the cases easier than in fact they are. In
these moments, the Court seems to be gripped by a form of "counter-
majoritarian anxiety": As unelected judges, applying statutes enacted
by our elected legislators, they feel some pressure to tie their results
rigorously to the expectations that legislators had when they enacted
the statute. Any result not related to majoritarian expectations may
seem illegitimate in a democracy.
This anxiety, which probably explains the persistence of foundation-
alist theories and rhetoric among scholars and jurists, can be dispelled
by persuasive arguments from the hermeneutical and pragmatic tradi-
tions. If the Court accepted these arguments, it would not only be
more explicit as to the practical reasoning by which it reaches its re-
sults, but in some cases it would probably reason differently. Specifi-
cally, it would be more likely to consider "evolutive" arguments that
stress the change in circumstances between enactment and decision.
I. THE FAILURE OF FOUNDATIONALIST THEORIES
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Traditional theories have always considered a variety of factors rele-
vant for statutory interpretation. 9 In the post-World War II era, how-
ever, legal scholars have preferred theories that offer a unitary
foundation for statutory interpretation. Much of the theoretical debate
has been over which of the competing foundations is the best one. The
three main theories today emphasize (1) the actual or presumed intent
of the legislature enacting the statute ("intentionalism"); (2) the actual
or presumed purpose of the statute ("purposivism" or "modified inten-
tionalism"); and (3) the literal commands of the statutory text ("textu-
alism"). 10 We call these theories "foundationalist," because each seeks
9. For examples of traditional treatises that avoid grand, foundational theories of statu-
tory interpretation, see F.A.R. BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1984); EARL THEODORE
CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES (1940); ELMER A. DRIEDGER, THE CONSTRUCTION
OF STATUTES (2d ed. 1983); MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (P. Langan 12th
ed. 1969); 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (N. Singer ed., C.D. Sands 4th ed.,
1985 revision). This pragmatic perspective is also exemplified by REED DICKERSON, THE IN-
TERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES 31-65 (1982).
10. Most of this terminology is taken from Paul Brest, The misconceived Quest for the Orii-
nal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980).
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an objective ground ("foundation") that will reliably guide the inter-
pretation of all statutes in all situations.
Each of the three grand theories seeks to reconcile statutory inter-
pretation by unelected judges with the assumptions of majoritarian
political theory. Toward this end, each seeks an objective standard that
will constrain the discretion of judicial interpreters. And each theory
fails. In light of both modem scholarship on interpretation and con-
crete experience in statutory cases, all three theories suffer from flawed
assumptions, indeterminacy, and nonexclusivity. To begin with, each
theory posits an anchoring value-legislative "intent" or "purpose," or
statutory "plain meaning"-that rests upon certain questionable as-
sumptions. When we examine these assumptions, each anchoring idea
loses its close link to majoritarian legitimacy. Moreover, upon close
scrutiny the essential indeterminacy of the anchoring ideas becomes
clear. Thus, legislative intent and purpose prove to be distressingly
malleable, and even such "hard" evidence as statutory text turns out to
be quite flexible. A grand theory loses much of its raison d'tre, we ar-
gue, if it cannot reliably assure determinate results. Finally, even if its
results were fully consistent with democratic principles and determi-
nate, if rigorously applied each theory would yield anomalous results
that most legal interpreters could not stomach. The anomalies arise in
part because none of the three anchors (intent, purpose, text) can alto-
gether exclude the other two. Nor does any of them adequately accom-
modate evolutive factors-current values and policies, as well as the
dynamics of the statutory policies as implemented over time. We illus-
trate these criticisms by reference to three Supreme Court cases which
we believe were correctly decided but which, taken together, cannot be
squared with any of the grand theories.
A. Intentionalism
The most popular grand theory is probably intentionalism. Under
this view, the Court acts as the enacting legislature's faithful servant,
discovering and applying the legislature's original intent. Traditional
treatises on statutory interpretation generally acknowledge the primacy
of legislative intent, qualifying the canons of construction with the ca-
veat, "unless the legislature otherwise intends."' I Although traditional
intentionalism was subjected to withering attack in the 1930s and
1940s,12 recent scholarship has revived academic interest in the theory
and posited some form of intentionalism as the anchor for a grand the-
11. This is perhaps most characteristic of 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
supra note 9, a leading treatise on statutory interpretation.
12. Max Radin was the most prominent critic. See Max Radin, Statutoy Interpretation, 43
HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). For a later analysis, see Max Radin, A Short ffay with Statutes, 56
HARV. L. REV. 388 (1942). For responses to Radin, see, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 9, at 68-
86;J. HURsr, supra note 9, at 32-40.
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ory of interpretation.' 3
Intentionalism makes a strong claim to be the only legitimate foun-
dation for statutory interpretation in a representative democracy. If the
legislature is the primary lawmaker and courts are its agents, then re-
quiring the courts to follow the legislature's intentions disciplines
judges by inhibiting judicial lawmaking, and in so doing seems to fur-
ther democracy by affirming the will of elected representatives. Not
surprisingly, then, a number of Supreme Court opinions state that orig-
inal legislative intent is the touchstone for statutory interpretation.1 4
We shall explore three different versions of intentionalism, starting
with the most obvious meaning-the actual intent of the legislators who
enacted the statute. If a majority of our elected representatives had a
certain interpretation in mind when they enacted a statute, that inter-
pretation has obvious appeal in a representative democracy. But if the
legislators did not clearly write that understanding into the statutory
text, how can we figure out what they "intended"? It is hard enough to
work out a theory for ascertaining the "intent" of individuals in tort
and criminal law. To talk about the "intent" of the legislature, as that
term is normally used, multiplies these difficulties, because we must
ascribe an intention not only to individuals, but to a sizeable group of
individuals-indeed, to two different groups of people (the House and
the Senate) whose views we only know from the historical record. 15
The historical record almost never reveals why each legislator voted for
(or against) a proposed law, and political science scholarship teaches
that legislators vote for bills out of many unknowable motives, includ-
ing logrolling, loyalty or deference to party and committee, desire not
to alienate blocks of voters, and pure matters of conscience.
16 Most of
these motives have little to do with the precise meaning, or the legisla-
tor's understanding, of the resulting legislative provisions.
Given these definitional and vote-counting problems, intentionalists
usually speak of conventional, rather than actual, legislative intent.
13. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985);
Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a iodified Intentionalist
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
14. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566 (1989)
(clear and unambiguous statutory language can be trumped by "other evidence of Congres-
sional intent"); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989) (lower court counsel fee cases
binding on Supreme Court because mentioned in a committee report and apparently ap-
proved by Congress); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984) ("sole task" of Court
in statutory interpretation is to determine congressional intent).
15. For this and other questions about aggregating collective intent, see Michael S.
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 12. See also RONALD DWORKIN, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316 (1985).
16. See, e.g., ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS
388, 401 (2d ed. 1985); Melissa P. Collie, moting Behavior in Legislatures, in HANDBOOK OF LEGIS-
LATIVE RESEARCH 471-518 (G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson & M. Jewell eds. 1985).
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Statements made in committee reports and floor statements by spon-
sors or floor managers of legislation presumably represent the legisla-
ture's views on specific issues. Conventional legislative intent is a
second-best approach, for it can be fully legitimated by majoritarian
norms only if legislators in general agree with, or at least acquiesce in,
the views of the few actively involved in the passage of the legislation.
This notion of conventional intent, however, may be inconsistent
with the actual operation of the legislative process. Committee mem-
bers and bill sponsors are not necessarily representative of the entire
Congress,' 7 and so it is not necessarily accurate to attribute their state-
ments to the whole body. Moreover, any theory of interpretation that
formally gives conclusive weight to the views of a legislative subgroup is
in tension with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of arti-
cle 1.18 Article I, section 7 provides that legislation is not valid law un-
less it has been passed by both chambers of Congress and presented to
(and in most cases signed by) the President; any enactment by just one
chamber, or even two chambers without presentment, is not a statute.
These procedural requirements, which exist to protect against factional
lawmaking, were stringently enforced by the Court in the legislative
veto case, INS v. Chadha.'9 As a formal matter, therefore, a method of
statutory interpretation that finds the meaning of a statute in the views
of a committee and sponsors might seem close to the fragmented law-
making that Chadha denounced. And as a functional matter, such a the-
ory seems to present opportunities for factionalism and strategic
manipulation that led the Court and some commentators 20 to question
the legislative veto: Interest groups often have their legislative allies
pack committee reports and stage planned colloquies to suggest a
meaning for the statute that they cannot place in the statutory
language. 21
In short, both actual and conventional approaches to legislative in-
tent rest upon flawed assumptions about the legislative process. Not
17. The membership of a committee may not represent a cross-section of the legislature.
Committee assignments are influenced by the legislators' desires for reelection and legislative
influence. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMIrEES 1-21, 43-45, 69 (1973);
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE (1978); see also Heinz Eulau, Committee Selec-
tion, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 16, at 191-237. It is therefore unsur-
prising, for example, that the members of the House Agriculture Committee generally
represent farm districts. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 1336 (1988). Thus, even if a committee report could be presumed to represent the
views of the median member of the committee majority, those views may not correlate well
with the preferences of the median member of the legislature as a whole.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
19. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Court noted that the President's veto power and the bi-
cameralism requirement protect against the "fear that special interests could be favored at the
expense of public needs." Id. at 950-51.
20. For an overview, see, e.g., Stanley C. Brubaker, Slouching Toward Constitutional Duty:
The Legislative IVeto and the Delegation of Authority, I CONST. COMMENTARY 81, 90-101 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Summary of Proceedings, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL CoMIY 162, 174-75 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988).
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surprisingly, these versions of intentionalism are also indeterminate in
practice, as illustrated in the landmark case of United Steelworkers v.
Weber.22 Weber arose under section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which makes it an unlawful employment practice "to discriminate
against any individual" because of his or her "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' 23 The broad issue in Weber was whether this lan-
guage (or similar language in section 703(d), which applies to appren-
ticeship programs) bars the establishment of voluntary affirmative
action plans for black workers. The report of the HouseJudiciary Com-
mittee on the civil rights bill in 1963 simply restated, in summary form,
the terms of what was to become Title VII of the Act. The minority
report, joined by Southern Democrats and a few conservative Republi-
cans, noted that nowhere did the bill define the critical term "discrimi-
nate" and that "the administration intends to rely upon its own
construction of 'discrimination' as including the lack of racial bal-
ance." 24 The minority report set forth several hypothetical situations,
and concluded that if the civil rights bill were enacted an employer
"may be forced to hire according to race, to 'racially balance' those who
work for him in every job classification or be in violation of Federal
law." '25 The issue was not a major focus of the House floor debate, but
the Chair of the Judiciary Committee claimed that the minority report
overstated the effect of the bill.2 6 Other supporters echoed the view
that "[t]here is nothing here as a matter of legislative history that would
require racial balancing."'27 After this debate, and with only one mate-
rial amendment to the jobs title (adding a prohibition against discrimi-
nation based upon gender), the House approved the bill by a vote of
290 to 130.
What was the "intent" of the House of Representatives on the Weber
issue? However defined, the House's intent is indeterminate. The
Southerners suggested that the bill went even beyond the result that
was later reached in Weber, but obviously they were trying to scare away
potential supporters of the bill. By denying that the bill required "ra-
cial balancing" (whatever that means), supporters of the bill behaved
just as strategically, trying to soothe concerns that the bill was too radi-
22. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
24. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 67-68, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2431, 2436.
25. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEvs at 2438 (emphasis omit-
ted). In a separate statement, the moderate Republican supporters of the bill said that its
enforcement "must confine its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality with
mathematical certainty." Id. at 29, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2516.
"All vestiges of inequality based solely on race must be removed." Id. at 30, reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2517.
26. He denied that the EEOC would have a roving mandate to correct any existing racial
imbalances. "Only actual discrimination could be stopped." 110 CONG. REC. 1518 (1964)
(remarks of Rep. Celler).
27. Id. at 2558 (remarks of Rep. Goodell).
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cal. Indeed, if the Weber issue had been brought to a vote as an amend-
ment to the jobs title, it is hard to predict how the vote would have
gone. Many Southerners might have voted in support for affirmative
action, hoping to kill the bill by making it too strong.28 Some Republi-
cans and Democrats would have joined them because of sincere sup-
port of affirmative action. Other supporters of the bill would have
voted against affirmative action, to attract moderate support for the
overall legislation. Perhaps many House members would have
abstained.
Moreover, even if it could be discovered, the intent of the House is
not the intent of Congress. Whatever inferences one draws about the
intent of the House must somehow be matched to the intent of the
Senate. A similar debate about affirmative preferences occurred in the
Senate, with similar posturing by interested Senators. Unlike the
House, however, the Senate amended the civil rights bill to add a provi-
sion touching upon the issue. Section 703(j), added as part of a com-
promise bill, provides that nothing in Title VII "shall be interpreted to
require any employer .. . to grant preferential treatment .. . to any
group because of the race.., of such.., group on account of" a de
facto racial imbalance in the employer's workforce. 29 This provision
was part of the bill that passed the Senate, was accepted by the House,
and was signed by the President. Unhappily, section 7030) addresses
only "requirjing]" employers to grant preferences, not whether em-
ployers are "permitted" to do so. As a formal matter, nothing more
seems relevant. Congress addressed the issue in section 7030); any
ambiguities simply reflect lack of legislative intent, to be resolved by
the courts. In this case, substance follows form, since the legislative
record affords us no better explanation of what the Members, or the
committees, or the sponsors wanted the bill to do. The intent of Con-
gress provides no clear answer to the interpretive puzzle in Weber.30
In addition to the actual and conventional approaches to intention-
alism is the version articulated by Judge Posner, "imaginative recon-
struction."' a Under this theory, the judge should imagine that she is
talking to the legislators at the time of enactment and should recon-
struct how the legislators would have answered the interpretive ques-
tion, given their values and their concerns. Where Congress has
28. Indeed, Title VII's prohibition on gender discrimination in employment was
adopted at least in part for similar reasons: House opponents of the Civil Rights Act strategi-
cally proposed and voted for the gender discrimination amendment in the hope that it would
kill the whole bill. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIvIL RIGHTS AcT 115-17 (1985).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982) (emphasis added).
30. For an interesting and somewhat similar discussion of the indeterminacy of Congres-
sional intent surrounding the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1982, seeJ. Morgan Kousser,
Expert Witnesses, Rational Choice and the Search for Intent, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 349, 361-63
(1988).
31. See R. POSNER, FEDERAL COuRTS, supra note 13, at 286.
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written a statute broadly or where its concerns do not allow us to recon-
struct its imagined intent, courts should simply seek the most reason-
able interpretation. While we believe Judge Posner's theory of
imaginative reconstruction is more sensible than other versions of in-
tentionalism, it too is subject to three critical problems.
First, the theory rests upon the questionable assumption that judges
will be able to recreate the historical understanding of a previous legis-
lature. Modem historiography suggests that a present-day interpreter
can never completely or accurately reconstruct past understandings.3 2
Facts about the past are without meaning until they are woven together
into a narrative by the historian (or judge). The nature of the story will
vary according to the way the storyteller selects and interprets the facts.
And in choosing and interpreting facts, even the most scrupulous histo-
rian will be influenced by her own biases, meta-theories, and desired
conclusions. This effect will be most palpable in hard cases. There,
judicial interpretation will most clearly be affected by the current con-
text of the judicial interpreter. And the greater the distance between
the current and historical contexts of the statute the more implausible
will be the claims of intentionalist interpretation.
In Weber, for example, the majority and dissenting Justices saw
themselves as amateur historians, imaginatively reconstructing the an-
swer to the interpretive puzzle. The majority and the dissenting opin-
ions looked at the same evidence and yet told vastly different stories of
what the Civil Rights Act meant, both generally and specifically in con-
nection with affirmative action. 33 We do not believe that either group
ofJustices was being dishonest. Rather, each was interpreting evidence
from very different perspectives on racial justice and political philoso-
phy. Neither group was-or, we argue, could be-entirely capable of
replicating the original response that Congress would have made to the
interpretive inquiry. Note, here, that the Court was examining a re-
cently enacted statute, passed only fifteen years before the Court's
opinion. Consider how much more complex the task would have been
for an older statute.
Second, Judge Posner's theory is indeterminate, because it often
asks counterfactual questions of a long-departed legislature. In the
hard cases, the interpretive issue will not have been precisely antici-
pated by the legislature. Every statute carries with it certain assump-
tions about the nature of law and society. Often, those assumptions
turn out to be wrong, or simplistic, or obsolescent in light of social
change-change that sometimes occurs in response to the statute itself.
32. For detailed examinations of this problem by two leading legal historians, see Wil-
liam E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986);
G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards, 60 TEx. L. REV. 569 (1982).
33. Conipare Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-09 (majority opinion by Brennan,J.) (Civil Rights Act
adopted to open doors for historically disadvantaged minorities), with id. at 219-55 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (statute adopted to promote a color-blind society).
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As the assumptions prove incorrect, the statute inevitably deviates from
its original course, by an often imperceptible process of implementa-
tion and interpretation. But once such changes have occurred, how
should an intentionalist judge even ask the interpretive question?
Should she try to ask how the enacting legislature, independent of con-
text, would have answered the question? Or how that legislature would
have answered the question if it had realized how society would
change?
For example, the Weber dissent made a good case for the proposition
that if the Senators and Representatives in 1964 had been asked the
question, "Do you want to allow voluntary quotas in hiring?" they
would have answered (if they were not voting strategically), "No, we
want to eliminate racial categories from employment decisions."' 34 The
majority opinion seemed to ask a different question of the original leg-
islators: "Would you allow voluntary preferences if it could be shown
that after 15 years an employer had less than 2 percent blacks in its
craft force, even though over 39 percent of the area's workforce is
black, and that the disparity is probably the result of the continuing
effects of past discrimination?"3 5 One can quite plausibly say that the
legislators in 1964 would have answered "Yes" to this form of the ques-
tion. Which of these questions is truer to the intentionalist approach?
Which is the more accurate reconstruction? We see no clear answers to
these queries.
Third, Judge Posner's focus on reconstructing original legislative
intent slights other values that we should respect when interpreting
statutes. At least some statutory schemes ought to be efficacious over
time and across changing circumstances.36 As the statute changes in
unexpected ways, the original legislative expectations may prevent the
statute from adapting to present conditions. To return to our prior
34. See generally id. at 230-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 203-04 & n.4 (majority opinion). See also id. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring), for a more forthright consideration of events occurring after the passage of the
statute.
36. A recent British treatise makes the point well. See F. BENNION, supra note 9, §§ 146,
163, 235, 326. For our purposes, it is worth quoting a small portion of Bennion's views:
Each generation lives under the law it inherits. Constant formal updating is not prac-
ticable, so an Act takes on a life of its own. What the original framers intended sinks
gradually into history. While their language may endure as law, its current subjects
are likely to find that law more and more ill-fitting.
The intention of the originators, collected from an Act's legislative history, nec-
essarily becomes less relevant as time rolls by. Yet their words remain law. Viewed
like this, the ongoing Act resembles a vessel launched on some one-way voyage from
the old world to the new. The vessel is not going to return; nor are its passengers.
Having only what they set out with, they cope as best they can. On arrival in the
present, they deploy their native endowments under conditions originally unguessed
at.
Id. at 356. Bennion asserts that a British statute is a "living Act" somewhat similar to the
American "living Constitution," id. at 356-57, and thus that "the intentions of the historical
legislator may not indefinitely continue to carry interpretative weight (or at least the same
weight)." Id. at 521.
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example, the implementation of Title VII by the EEOC and private par-
ties generated unanticipated tensions within the statutory scheme, such
as whether to permit facially neutral job classifications that in effect dis-
proportionately disadvantaged certain racial groups. After the EEOC
and the courts had gained much experience with this issue, the
Supreme Court in 1971 held that a violation of Title VII could be estab-
lished by showing that the practice had racially disparate effects without
substantial job-related justifications.37 This decision had two impor-
tant effects on the way Title VII was understood. First, it underscored
the idea that results matter-as the Court put it, "practices, procedures,
or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, can-
not be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices."'38 Second, it created a practical
problem for employers and unions. Even if they did not intend to treat
blacks differently from whites, they faced potential Title VII liability if
substantial racial imbalance in their workplace persisted over time.
What could such employers and unions do but adopt some form of vol-
untary preference programs to improve the statistics?
In 1964, Congress expected-or at least pretended to expect-that
if racial discrimination were eliminated in employment, blacks would
gain employment opportunities long denied them. That did not always
happen. The original intent of Congress on this issue is thus not very
helpful in solving a critical problem of implementing the statute. The
Weber result addresses this problem by permitting voluntary prefer-
ences, at least where racial imbalance has persisted and the overall pur-
poses of the statute are not being served. This justification of Weber,
made in a concurring opinion,3 9 is on the whole the most narrow, and
most persuasive, justification for the result. It looks past original intent
to the practical operation of the statutory scheme.
B. Purposivism
The legal realists-especially Max Radin-raised some of the objec-
tions to intentionalism noted above and proposed as an alternative the-
ory a flexible "mischief" approach to statutory interpretation.40
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in the 1950s expanded the
realists' approach into a "purposivist" theory of interpretation that
seemed as faithful to the principle of legislative supremacy as intention-
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), qualified n Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
38. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
39. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (following 563 F.2d 216, 227-
39 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
40. In a nutshell, the Court should determine what mischief, or ill, the legislature had
targeted in passing the statute and then should interpret the statute to attack that mischief as
manifested under current circumstances. SeeJerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on
Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLuM. L. REv. 1259, 1269-72 (1947); Radin, A Short 11 av with Stat-
utes, supra note 12, at 398-99.
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alism, but without the rigidity and definitional problems of intentional-
ism. According to the Hart and Sacks legal process materials,
4'
"[e]very statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act.
The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the
idea of law and inadmissible."'42 Because "every statute and every doc-
trine of unwritten law developed by the decisional process has some
kind of purpose or objective," identifying that purpose and deducing
the interpretation with which it is most consistent resolves interpretive
ambiguities.
43
As an alternative to intentionalism, purposivism has been rather
successful, and some commentators believe that it is now the "tradi-
tional" theory of statutory interpretation. 44 The Supreme Court ap-
pears to rely on this approach frequently, as it did in Weber, to reject
interpretations that, while plausibly grounded in statutory text and his-
tory, would "'bring about an end completely at variance with the pur-
pose of the statute.' -45 On the other hand, purposivism is subject to
the same problems as intentionalism-unrealistic assumptions, indeter-
minacy, and competing values. We shall explore those problems in
connection with Weber and conclude with an examination of the
Supreme Court's decision in Grifin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. ,46 a deci-
sion rejecting purposivist theory as the foundation for statutory
interpretation.
First, purposivism's apparent majoritarian justifications rest upon
41. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF L-W (tentative ed. 1958). For an overview of the Hart &
Sacks materials, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PIr. L. REV. 691, 693-700 (1987).
42. 2 H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 41, at 1156. Hart and Sacks do not take a hard-
and-fast position on this and other issues posed in the text, for they ask, "Are the following
conclusions well founded?" Id. We consider this a rhetorical question.
43. 1 Id. at 166-67; see 2 id. at 1148-79 (more extensive analysis of the purposivist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation). Hart and Sacks formally announced their approach to
statutory interpretation in the following "tentative formulation":
In interpreting a statute a court should:
I. Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out
the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the words
either-
(a) a meaning they will not bear, or
(b) a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear
statement.
Id. at 1200.
44. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory In-
teypretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 223, 250-51 (1986).
45. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295,
315 (1953)). For recent examples in which the Court relies on overall statutory purpose as
the key argument, see EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1671-74
(1988); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443-48 (1988); School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-80 (1987); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 284-86 (1987).
46. 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
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questionable assumptions about the legislative process. Hart and Sacks
assumed that the legislature is filled with reasonable people who will
reach reasonable, purposive results by following established proce-
dures.47 Whether Hart and Sacks thought this assumption reflected the
realities of the legislative process is unclear. But it was a plausible
working assumption for the legal community in the 1950s, given the
state of political science.48 And since Hart and Sacks expressed no ca-
veat along these lines, much less attempted any elaborate normative
justification for these assumptions if they were deemed unrealistic, it
appears that at least some of the legitimacy of their approach depends
upon the empirical accuracy of these assumptions.
These optimistic legal process assumptions have received a consid-
erable amount of theoretical and empirical testing since the 1950s and
must now be considered naive. Public choice theory, the application of
economic analysis to public decisionmaking,49 posits that "rational"
legislators responding to rational interest groups will not, in fact, pro-
duce purposive statutes. Economic game theory suggests that, fre-
quently, nothing more than who controls the legislature's agenda
determines legislative results. 50 Interest group theory suggests that
much legislation simply distributes benefits to well-organized groups,
typically at the expense of the general public.5 1 To speak of a statute's
"purpose" is incoherent, unless one means the deal between rent-seek-
ing groups and reelection-minded legislators. To be sure, public
choice is a controversial approach to legislation,5 2 but the insights
47. See 2 H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 41, at 1415 (court "should assume, unless the
contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursu-
ing reasonable purposes reasonably"). The statutes adopted by these legislators are conclu-
sively presumed to be purposive acts. See text accompanying note 42 supra. Legislation is
viewed as the result of an informed, deliberative, and efficient process. See Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 41, at 696-97.
48. Leading authorities in the 1950s posited that politics involved the interplay of inter-
est groups and that this usually resulted in good policy because groups formed on all sides of
important issues. See, e.g., WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (1949); EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS (1952); DAVID B. TRUMAN,
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); see also THEODOREJ. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51
(1969).
49. This approach is summarized and its implications explored in William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Politics IWithout Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theoryfor Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, TheJurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 873 (1987). Leading works include JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965); GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theoty of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGNIT.
Sci. 3 (1971).
50. SeeJ. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 49.
51. In addition to the sources in note 49 supra, see MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEY-
STONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGIS-
LATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
52. See generally Mark Kelman, On Democrac,-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empiical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
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presented here-the potential arbitrariness and unfairness of many leg-
islative decisions-are supported by more traditional institutional polit-
ical theory as well. Leading scholars of legislative institutions stress the
ability of committees and power figures to manipulate legislative proce-
dure,53 and the importance of "subgovernments" of bureaucrats, lob-
byists, and subcommittee leaders who push the legislative agenda
toward distributing favors to organized groups.
54
Modem political theory, especially public choice theory, renders the
political theory assumptions of purposivist statutory interpretation
highly controversial. It seems clear not only that reasonable people in
the legislature do not always produce reasonable results, but that in
some cases that is the last thing they want to do. Some statutes are
little else but backroom deals. Judicial attempts to fancy up those deals
with public-regarding rhetoric either are naive or simply substitute the
judge's conception of public policy for that of the legislature. And
when a court uses purposivist analysis to elaborate a statute, it may ac-
tually undo a deliberate and precisely calibrated deal worked out in the
legislative process. 55 Suchjudicial lawmaking can often be justified, we
think, but the point is that this is judicial lawmaking and not, as some
legal process thinkers might suggest, merely carrying out the original
statutory purposes.
Second, purposivism is indeterminate, for some of the reasons just
developed. The complex compromises endemic in the political process
suggest that legislation is frequently a congeries of different and some-
times conflicting purposes. To be enacted, a statute must be acceptable
to a range of interest groups, each of which will have their own reasons
for supporting, or at least not opposing, the statute. Some commenta-
tors argue that these various purposes cannot be aggregated into a pub-
lic purpose.56 Moreover, even if such an aggregation were theoretically
possible, supporters of legislation will usually appeal to more than one
public purpose in order to maximize political support.
53. See, e.g., TERRY SULLIVAN, PROCEDURAL STRUCTURE: SUCCESS AND INFLUENCE IN CON-
GRESS (1984).
54. See, e.g., RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 6-10, 13-28 (4th ed. 1987). Even one of the leading theorists who believes
that Congress is often public-seeking nonetheless describes it as an "organized anarchy."
JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 48-74 (1984).
55. As the Court itself has recognized:
Application of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of specific provisions
ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to address and the
dynamics of legislative action. Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out
some vague social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ
sharply on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation
may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation of the "plain purpose" of legisla-
tion at the expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes
of compromise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74
(1986).
56. For an overview, see Macey, supra note 44, at 227-33.
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Reconsider Title VII and the Weber case in light of these two criti-
cisms of purposivism. Title VII seems to be one of the most purposive
statutes we have adopted in the last 30 years, and its requirement of
nondiscrimination is a great purpose. Yet that purpose is compromised
in many ways by statutory exceptions for small businesses, union sen-
iority arrangements, and so forth. 57 Thus, it is not a principle that
Congress was willing to implement at any price. How, then, can the
overall purpose control statutory interpretation, when it is clear that
Congress itself did not believe in it without reservation? Moreover, the
general nondiscrimination purpose of Title VII does not help us an-
swer the interpretive question in Weber, where the issue is the very
meaning of "discrimination." The Court's reasoning seized upon one
specific purpose of Title VII to create the following syllogism: (1) Con-
gress's purpose was to move blacks into mainstream jobs; (2) affirma-
tive action is a useful way to speed up the process of getting more jobs
for blacks; therefore, (3) affirmative action is permissible under the stat-
ute because it is consistent with the statute's purpose. 58 This line of
reasoning is made compelling only by romanticizing the legislative pro-
cess and subordinating other purposes of Title VII.
Weber's evidence that the purpose of Title VII was to obtain jobs for
blacks was a series of quotations from the Senate debates and from
President Kennedy's speech proposing the legislation. All of the quo-
tations came from liberal Democrats-Senators Humphrey, Clark, and
Edward Kennedy, as well as the President. So what? If the Court is
trying to show that the entire Senate, let alone the entire Congress,
believed that the main purpose of the employment discrimination title
was to obtain real results, the evidence is pretty flimsy. Although
Humphrey and Clark were key players in the debate, their views were
not necessarily representative of the twenty-seven Republicans who
supported the bill, or even of the approximately twenty western and
border state Democrats who supported the bill. More representative of
the views of supporting Republican conservatives were the statements
of Senator Dirksen, the Senate Minority Leader, who found the bill's
central purpose to be "equality of opportunity," not equality of re-
sults. 59 For Dirksen, therefore, the purpose of the bill was to assure
color-blind decisions in employment. That purpose is not carried out
by affirmative action, which is color-conscious. By asserting the "re-
sults purpose" and ignoring the "color-blindness purpose," Weber sub-
ordinates one plausible purpose of Title VII to another, without any
effort to acknowledge the subordination, much less justify it. In an ef-
fort to support its decision in terms of original legislative expectations,
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) (definition of"employer" excluding federal govern-
ment, private clubs, and businesses with fewer than fifteen employees); id. § 2000e-2(h) (pro-
tecting bona fide seniority systems).
58. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-04.
59. See 110 CONG. REC. 14,510 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
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then, Weber overstates its argument and distorts the evidence. At best,
the Weber result is judicial gapfilling of an indeterminate statute. At
worst, it is judicial lawmaking inconsistent with legislative supremacy.
60
Third, although purposivism often permits statutes to develop over
time, as Weber may illustrate, purposivism cannot be accepted as a gen-
eral theory because it neglects other values we consider critically im-
portant. Representative democracy places some value on faithfulness
to original legislative intentions. It also is committed to following de-
terminate texts: Because text is the only thing actually enacted into
law, it is formally the most legitimate expression of legislative intent or
purpose. Moreover, it is argued, citizens ought to be able to rely on
clear statutory text to determine their rights and duties.
For this last reason in particular, the Supreme Court often finds the
intentionalist and the purposivist approaches insufficient and purports
to rely simply on the statutory text. Several recent opinions take this
position, 61 including the celebrated snail darter case, 62 but we shall use
a less well-known decision, Grifin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.6 3 Griffin, a
welder working on Oceanic's vessels in the North Sea, was injured dur-
ing his employment and subsequently discharged. Oceanic withheld
$412.50 in earned wages. Griffin brought suit under a federal statute
that required certain maritime employers to pay wages within a speci-
fied period after terminating a seaman's employment. The statute fur-
ther provided: "Every master or owner who refuses or neglects to
make payment in the manner hereinbefore mentioned without suffi-
cient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for
each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the re-
60. Compare Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ.
281 (1989) (arguing that the majority opinion in Weber is inconsistent with legislative
supremacy) with William N. Eskridge,Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ. 319 (1989)
(arguing that Weber is consistent with legislative supremacy).
61. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1030-32 (1989) (plain mean-
ing of statute, established by "punctuation rule," trumps established judicial interpretations
prior to statutory revision); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 419-23 (1988)
(plain meaning controls, notwithstanding argument that text contained "scrivener's error");
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 (1986)
("The 'plain purpose' of legislation.., is determined in the first instance with reference to the
plain language of the statute itself."); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); North Da-
kota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1983) (language conclusive absent clear contrary
purpose); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483 (1981) (not one of those "rare and exceptional"
cases where the Court will go beyond unambiguous language); Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (no clear legislative intent contrary
to the statutory language); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1979); United Air
Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 199 (1977) (legislative history irrelevant if statute unam-
biguous) (superseded by statute as stated in Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400
(1985)). See generally Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the
Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 892 (1982) (student author).
62. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978) (plain language of fed-
eral statute forbade completion of $107 million dam project that would result in destruction
of a species of fish known as the snail darter) (superseded by statute as stated in Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986)).
63. 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
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spective periods . ... ,64 The trial court found Oceanic liable for the
withheld wages and assessed the penalty for the period between dis-
charge (1 April 1976) and Griffin's reemployment (5 May 1976); the
penalty amounted to $6,881.60. The Supreme Court directed that the
penalty be recalculated to reflect the period between discharge and the
actual date of payment of the $412.50 (which was not until after the
trial court's judgment). The Court relied on the literal terms of the
statute, which says that the owner "shall pay" penalty wages "for each
and every day during which payment is withheld"; no exceptions ap-
pear on the face of the statute. Hence, the penalty became
$302,790.40, by the Court's calculations.
This striking result was disputed in a dissenting opinion by Justice
Stevens, who relied on both legislative intent and purpose to argue that
the penalty statute gave trial courts discretion to toll the penalty period
at an equitable time. The original statute, enacted in 1872, used
mandatory language ("shall") to assure that additional wages were
awarded, but double wages could only be awarded for up to ten days,
and courts had discretion to award even less than that.65 Congress
amended the statute in 1898 to eliminate the ten-day limit, but it re-
tained the mandatory language. 66 Given the fairly routine nature of the
1898 amendment and the absence of legislative comment, the dissent
suggested that Congress did not intend to abrogate judicial discretion
to award less than the maximum amount. More important, the Court's
broad interpretation of the 1898 change would go well beyond the stat-
ute's purpose, which was simply to compensate seamen for additional
expenses incurred after discharge (often in a foreign land), not afford
them a windfall.
67
Like many intentionalist and purposivist arguments, these are not as
determinate as they seem. The critical 1898 amendment actually did
two important things: it eliminated the ten-day cap on recovery, and it
64. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (repealed 1983).
65. Act ofJune 7, 1872, ch. 322, § 35, 17 Stat. 269:
[E]very master or owner who neglects or refuses to make payment [of a seaman's
earned wages within five days after a seaman's discharge] without sufficient cause
shall pay to the seaman a sum not exceeding the amount of two days' pay for each of
the days, not exceeding ten days, during which payment is delayed beyond [the five-
day period] and such sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim made before the
court ....
66. Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28, § 4, 30 Stat. 756:
Every master or owner who refuses or neglects to make payment [of a seaman's
earned wages within four days of the seaman's discharge] without sufficient cause
shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to one day's pay for each and every day during
which payment is delayed beyond the [four-day period], which sum shall be recover-
able as wages in any claim made before the court ....
As appears from the text, the 1898 statute also changed the period of permissible delay (from
five to four days) and made the penalty single rather than double wages. The latter change
was reversed by the Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 3, 38 Stat. 1164, which substituted "two
days' pay" for "one day's pay."
67. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 588-89 & n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rewrote the statute as a whole to delete the explicit grant of judicial
discretion. The committee reports identified the purpose of the 1898
amendment as "the amelioration of the condition of the American
seamen" and stated that the strengthened penalty wage provision was
"designed to secure the promptest possible payment of wages."' 68 Un-
happily, none of the legislative materials tells us exactly how draconian
Congress expected penalty wages to be. Nor is the general purpose of
the statute instructive. If the statute's purpose was merely to compen-
sate seamen for incidental expenses while they relocated and found
new employment, and no stringent deterrence or punishment of the
employer was intended, then the dissent's interpretation is correct. If,
on the other hand, the statute was meant strongly to deter withholding
of wages from vulnerable seamen, then the Court's interpretation is
perhaps correct-but only if Congress suspected that judges (few of
whom had represented seamen in private practice and more of whom
had represented vessels) would otherwise fudge on the punitive
sanction.69
Even if the statutory purpose had supported the dissent's position
more clearly, a majority of the Justices would probably have reached
the same result in Griffin, because of the competing value the Court
found in enforcing the relatively clear statutory text. Citizens ought to
be able to open up the statute books and have a good idea of their
rights and obligations. When the statute seems plainly to say one
thing, courts should be reluctant to alter that directive. Thus, in Griffin
the Court sent a message to vessel owners: The provisions of the mari-
time code set forth some pretty clear obligations, which judges will en-
force to the letter. This discourages owners, who obviously have
greater resources than seamen, from engaging in strategic wage with-
holding or dilatory litigation. And it signals to the owners and the
seamen that the law will be applied to them in a predictable manner.70
68. H.R. REP. No. 1657, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1898); see Griffin, 458 U.S. at 572-74.
69. Justice Stevens' approach in Griffin is somewhat similar to an "absurd result" excep-
tion to statutory plain meaning. See generally 2 H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 41, at 1144
(labeling this the "golden rule" of statutory interpretation). Even conceding the validity of
this "rule" fails to provide a determinate answer in Griffin. If one asks whether it seems absurd
that Griffin gets over $300,000 when only $412 was wrongfully withheld and he promptly
obtained reemployment, the answer would seem to be affirmative. But if one concludes that
the award in Griffin will deter maritime system-wide abuse of a relatively defenseless class of
employees, that result seems quite plausible.
In the end, one of us is comfortable with the outcome in Griffin. The other is uncomforta-
ble, but leaning in that direction as well. Both of us agree that the statute has more than
merely a compensatory purpose; how much more is the key question. At all events, a "pur-
pose approach" in Griffin seems mostly to beg the question, not resolve it.
70. Indeed, in 1983, as part of a major recodification, Congress repealed the penalty
statute at issue in Griffin, but replaced it with one containing precisely the same kind of
mandatory language. See Pub. L. No. 98-89, 97 Stat. 566 (1983) (codified at 46 U.S.C.
§ 10313(g) (Supp. V 1987)). The legislative history reveals that Congress was engaged in
merely a recodification and wished to avoid considering substantive changes that could cause
substantial interest-group turmoil. See H.R. REP. No. 338, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 117-20
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 929-32. Yet the House committee
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C. Textualism
The legal realists and legal process thinkers discredited intentional-
ism as a grand strategy for statutory interpretation; in its place they
suggested purposivism. That theory has in turn been extensively criti-
cized, especially by scholars influenced by the law and economics move-
ment. As argued above, the recent trend is to view the legislature as
not necessarily purposive; "attributing" purposes to ad hoc statutory
deals is nothing if not judicial lawmaking. Accordingly, several judges
of the law and economics school have responded to the critique of
purposivism by urging as a grand theory the return to some version of
the old "plain meaning rule": The beginning, and usually the end, of
statutory interpretation should be the apparent meaning of the statu-
tory language.
7 1
The arguments for textualism are strong ones. As suggested above,
textualism appeals to the rule-of-law value that citizens ought to be able
to read the statute books and know their rights and duties. By empha-
sizing the statutory words chosen by the legislature, rather than (what
seem to be) more abstract and judicially malleable interpretive sources,
textualism also appeals to the values of legislative supremacy and judi-
cial restraint.
There are at least two varieties of textualism. The stricter version
posits the statutory text as (at least ordinarily) the sole legitimate inter-
pretive source. A characteristically pithy Holmesianism says it well:
"We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the
statute means." 7 2 The second, and less ambitious, variety of textualism
report strongly endorsed textualism rather than intentionalism or purposivism as the appro-
priate interpretive method:
The Committee intends and hopes that the interpretation of the maritime safety
laws as codified and enacted by this bill will be based on the language of the bill
itself. The bill, as reported, is based on that premise. There should, therefore, be
little or no occasion to refer to the statutes being repealed in order to interpret the
provisions of this bill.
The Committee also feels, as the courts have held, that the literal language of
the statute should control the disposition of the cases. There is no mandate in logic
or in case law for reliance on legislative history to reach a result contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute, particularly where that plain meaning is in no way
unreasonable.
H.R. REP. No. 338, supra, at 120, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 932.
71. Namely, Justice Scalia, see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1831-34
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (plain meaning approach, and
clearly not purpose approach, is required by democratic theory); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("if the language of a statute is
clear, that language must be given effect at least in the absence of a patent absurdity"); Hir-
schey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); Address by Judge
Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (delivered in different forms at various
law schools, 1985-86), discussed in Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 442-43;
and Judge Easterbrook, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533,
544 (1983); cf. United States v. Medico Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 840, 844 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easter-
brook, J.) (when Congress changes the rule rather than the objective the rule is to serve, the
courts must reject claims attacking the rule in the name of the objective).
72. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theoy of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 419
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uses statutory language not in place of, but rather as the best guide to,
legislative intent or purpose. "There is, of course, no more persuasive
evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legis-
lature undertook to give expression to its wishes." 73 Similarly, "when
words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of
the legislative intent."' 74 As a grand theory, both versions of textualism
suffer from similar defects: They oversimplify the meaning of statutory
texts, are not so determinate as they sound, and ignore other values our
polity considers important. We shall explore each of these criticisms
again by reference to the decisions in Weber and Griffin. We conclude
our analysis of textualism by discussing Bob Jones University v. United
States,75 a decision in which the Court broke with textualism to pursue
other important social values.
Textualism can control statutory interpretation only if the text itself
offers a complete and reasonably determinate source of meaning. This
proposition has long been contested, and it is more controversial than
ever today. Whether or not language itself is intrinsically indetermi-
nate, one would have to concede that general, politicized terms such as
"discrimination" are susceptible of different interpretations. 76 The
statute in Weber makes it an unlawful practice for an employer or union
"to discriminate against any individual because of his race." The dis-
senting opinion chided the Court for ignoring the "plain language" of
the statute. 77 Yet this criticism presupposes that "discrimination"
means "any differentiation based upon race." That is one definition of
"discrimination," but not the only one. "Discrimination" can also
mean a "differentiation because of an invidious reason," and indeed
the Supreme Court itself has found intentional invidious conduct to be
a significant component of discrimination in other circumstances. 78
(1899), repnnted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920).
Nevertheless,Justice Holmes later wrote that when interpreting amendments of old statutory
language, "the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down." United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143
(1905). For a recent variation, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, II HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 59, 65 (1988) (we should replace the meaningless
concept of legislative intent and "look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they
would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words").
73. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940),followed and
quoted in Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087, 2092 (1988).
74. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
75. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
76. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 381
(1941); Michael S. Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 181-99 (1981).
77. "Were Congress to act today specifically to prohibit the type of racial discrimination
suffered by Weber, it would be hard pressed to draft language better tailored to the task than
that found in ... Title VII ... e." W ber, 443 U.S. at 226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). To the
same effect is Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670-71 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
78. Thus, the Court has found no fourteenth amendment "discrimination" when state
conduct harming racial groups has not been "intentional" (read "invidious") and has only
"resulted" in differentiation. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),followedin City of
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"Discrimination" has acquired nuances that are hard to capture. For
example, in common usage we do not say we "discriminate" against
peaches because we prefer pears (although this would arguably be a
correct use of the word). Is it any more natural to say we are "discrimi-
nating" when we establish a program to try to rectify past misdeeds by
hiring or training more people who have suffered invidious "discrimi-
nation" at our hands in the past?
Even those who agree with us that "discrimination" in Weber is not
textually determinate might argue that the double wages statute in Grif-
fin is determinate, because it is more detailed and does not use terms
that have a rich variety of connotations. But is that so? The statute says
the owner "shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for
each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the re-
spective periods." The statute does not explicitly provide that "there
shall be no diminishment of such recovery of double wages for any rea-
son whatsoever." Like statutes of limitations which employ similarly
broad and mandatory terms, the penalty statute could be interpreted to
permit judicial tolling of the double wage award, with no greater vio-
lence to the statutory language. In addition, a statutory prerequisite to
recovery of the penalty in Griffin was the employer's failure to pay wages
"without sufficient cause,"'79 a vague term that could be construed to
delegate discretion to the court to toll the running of the penalty. 0
Although the "plain meaning" of the statute lends support to the
Court's interpretation in Griffin, it hardly requires it.
An additional problem with any strict textualist theory is its failure
to consider that the meaning of text is strongly influenced by context.81
If we were to write you a note, "Go fetch us some meat," you could not
interpret that note without knowing and understanding its context.8 2
This same sort of analysis is readily applicable to legal texts. When
Congress told us in 1964 that we should not "discriminate" on the ba-
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
79. The statute is quoted in the text accompanying note 64 supra.
80. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 580-84 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
81. "'Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal exis-
tence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggre-
gate take their purport from the setting in which they were used ......."Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa
Dep't of Revenue, 109 S. Ct. 278, 281 n.6 (1988) (quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d
954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)); see Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 199 (1983).
82. Have you regularly been fetching us meat? If so, you might reasonably assume that
we want the same sort of meat you have been bringing us heretofore. What is the purpose of
this order for meat? If you know from prior context that we are having a fancy dinner party,
you might bring us prime steaks. If you know the meat is for breakfast tomorrow morning,
you might bring us bacon and sausage. What kind of meat do we like generally? If you know
we despise red meat, you might bring us fowl, or perhaps even fish (which many people don't
consider meat at all). And so on. See 2 H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 41, at 1146-47 (ex-
cerpting FRANcis LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICs 17-20 (2d ed. 1880)).
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sis of race in employment decisions, did we not know from ten years of
experience with Brown, from the horrific pictures of Bull Connor's
firehoses pummelling black youths marching against racism, from the
March on Washington, and from Dr. Martin Luther King's eloquent
speeches and letters, that the point of the statute was to seek justice for
a group that had systematically been treated unjustly in our society?
The thrust of the Court's opinion in Weber was that our country's com-
mitment in Title VII was to results as well as process. In the context of
racial injustice in this country, one lesson is that differentiation penaliz-
ing black Americans is not the same as differentiation seeking to re-
dress patterns of prior prejudice and oppression.
A final problem undercuts textualism: the importance of the inter-
preter's own context, including current values. Philosophy and literary
theory suggest to us that interpretation cannot aspire to universal ob-
jectivity, since the interpreter's perspective will always interact with the
text and historical context.83 Had we been presented with the Weber
issue in 1964, we might well have agreed that affirmative action was
neither necessary nor proper under Title VII, for we might have been
filled with hopeful expectation that Title VII would engender color-
and sex-blind hiring decisions and would integrate blacks and other
groups into the workforce. Fifteen years later, we would have voted to
uphold the affirmative action arrangement in Weber, because we were
less optimistic that patterns of discrimination could be eliminated in a
short time by a color-blind approach. Some years from now, we might
vote to curtail Weber, if we believe that affirmative action has outlived its
usefulness and erected new and more subtle forms of racial barriers.8 4
The more general point, of course, is that current values cannot eas-
ily be excluded from statutory interpretation.85 Where current values
and historical context strongly support an interpretation, a determinate
text will not stand in the way. Consider the Bob Jones case.8 6 The issue
was whether a nonprofit private school prescribing racially discrimina-
tory admissions standards could qualify for exemption from federal in-
come taxes. Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provided
an exemption for institutions "organized and operated exclusively for
83. The assertion in text is associated with the work of Gadamer, see note 5 supra, and
Gadamer himself rested upon a rich tradition of hermeneutics and historiography. See DAVID
COUZENs Hoy, THE CRITICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HIsTORY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEU-
TICS (1978); G. WARNKE, supra note 5, at 5-41.
84. This is an essential message of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), and may have inspired the Court's willingness
in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), to deemphasize the importance
of statistical disparities in employment discrimination lawsuits.
85. Eskridge, supra note 3, argues this point in greater detail and provides a range of
examples from recent Supreme Court decisions. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in
Statuto? Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989).
86. BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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religious, charitable, . . .or educational purposes. '8 7 Although Bob
Jones University was an "educational" institution falling within the lit-
eral terms of the statutory exemption, a nearly unanimous Supreme
Court held that it did not qualify, based upon an expansively contextu-
alist approach to the statute. Historically, the income tax exemption
was for "charitable organizations" because they performed public serv-
ices of value to society.88 The historical purpose of the statute would
be thwarted, the Court argued, if the exemption were extended to or-
ganizations that are not "charitable," in the sense that their activities
are "contrary to a fundamental public policy." 89 To establish that Bob
Jones's activities did not meet this fundamental test, the Court re-
counted the judicial, executive, and legislative pronouncements against
racial segregation in the last thirty years. 90 The Court spent almost no
time analyzing the statutory text, apparently because it considered the
contextual arguments so compelling.91
Bob Jones is but one example of the refusal of the Court to rely on
textualism when contextual arguments strongly cut against the textual
ones.9 2 Thus, for practical as well as theoretical reasons, textualism
87. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). Section 170 of the Code, id. § 170(c)(2)(B), provides a
parallel deduction for contributions to institutions "organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable .... or educational purposes."
88. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 587, 591-92.
89. Id. at 592.
90. Id. at 592-96.
91. In fact, though, the statutory language in Bob Jones is less than crystal clear. A maxim
of statutory interpretation, noscitur a sociis, suggests that sometimes light may be shed on the
meaning of statutory words by the words surrounding them. See, e.g., W. ESKRiDGE & P.
FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 639-40. In Bob Jones, the provision in question granted tax-exempt
status to "[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition..., or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals .. " 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). Read in
the context of the surrounding words, "educational" may well take on the "public interest"
glow that the majority in Bob Jones gave to it. Moreover, schools qualify under § 501(c)(3) only
if they are organized exclusively for educational purposes. This requirement seemingly man-
dates that the entity deciding § 501(c)(3) status-that is, the IRS or the courts-must judge
whether a school has any features that may be deemed noneducational or anti-educational. At
all events, any literalist meaning cutting against the majority's interpretation cannot be seen
as so strong as to overwhelm the enormous contextual and policy justifications supporting the
majority's result.
Note that ChiefJustice Burger, a stickler for textual analysis in other cases, see, e.g., Board
of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986), wrote the
opinion for the Court. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
92. For other recent examples, see EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 108 S. Ct.
1666, 1671-74 (1988); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625-34 (1987); see also id. at 636-40
(O'Connor, J., concurring); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-86
(1987) (plurality opinion); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986); Midlan-
tic Nat'l Bank v. NewJersey'Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1986); Lowe v.
SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925
(1984); Dickman v. Commissionew 465 U.S. 330, 344 (1984); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984); Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356 (1983). See also Wald, supra note 81, at 195
(citations omitted):
[A]lthough the Court still refers to the 'plain meaning' rule, the rule has effectively
been laid to rest. No occasion for statutory construction now exists when the Court
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will not work as a foundational approach to statutory interpretation.
We have, of course, come full circle. Intentionalism and purposivism
work no better. It appears that foundationalism has failed.
93
II. A POSITIVE MODEL OF PRACTICAL REASONING
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The analysis in Part I not only shows that the leading foundational-
ist theories are flawed, but it also suggests an alternative to these views
of statutory interpretation. In what follows we build a positive descrip-
tive theory of statutory interpretation from an analysis of the Court's
actual practice in statutory interpretation cases, such as Weber, Griffin,
and Bob Jones, and from our interpretation of the pragmatic and herme-
neutical traditions in philosophy. This positive theory only seeks to
make sense out of the Court's practice in statutory interpretation, in
ways that foundationalism cannot. We reserve for Part III our norma-
tive evaluation of the Court's practice.
Each type of problem with foundationalism that we identified in Part
I suggests one facet of our positive theory. We argued above that the
leading foundationalist theories cannot redeem their claim to follow
from the very nature of majoritarian democracy, that they do not yield
objective and determinate answers, and that they cannot convincingly
exclude other values, including current values. Weber, Griffin, and Bob
Jones illustrate our theoretical critique and suggest that the Supreme
Court does not follow any one of the foundationalist theories. We now
suggest that these observations form the basis for a positive theory
which refuses to privilege intention, purpose or text as the sole touch-
stone of interpretation, but which both explains the Supreme Court's
practice in statutory interpretation and, at the same time, reflects the
insights of modem theories of interpretation.
First, statutory interpretation involves creative policymaking by
judges and is not just the Court's figuring out the answer that was put
"in" the statute by the enacting legislature. An essential insight of her-
meneutics is that interpretation is a dynamic process, and that the inter-
preter is inescapably situated historically. "Every age has to
understand a transmitted text in its own way," says Gadamer.
The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not
depend on the contingencies of the author and whom he originally
wrote for. It certainly is not identical with them, for it is always partly
determined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and hence
will not look at the legislative history. When the plain meaning rhetoric is invoked, it
becomes a device not for ignoring legislative history but for shifting onto legislative
history the burden of proving that the words do not mean what they appear to say.
93. It goes without saying that the three theories discussed in the text do not exhaust the
range of possible foundationalist theories. For the reasons expressed in Parts I and II, how-
ever, we doubt that any other foundationalist approach could be more successful.
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by the totality of the objective course of history.9 4
Gadamer's primary metaphor for interpretation is a "fusion of hori-
zons" 95 : The historical text contains assumptions and "preunderstand-
ings" 9 6-a "horizon"-which is often quite different from the
"horizon" of the later interpreter. That is why interpretation is difficult
and not mechanical. Because the horizons are alienated from one an-
other, the interpreter can never completely recreate or understand the
text's horizon. Yet that does not defeat interpretation, if it is viewed as
an effort to seek common ground between the two often distant hori-
zons. That common ground is always possible, Gadamer says, because
the temporal gulf is filled with traditions and experience that inform
our current horizon and link it with the previous one.
9 7
Hermeneutics suggests that the text lacks meaning until it is inter-
preted. Given the importance of the interpretive horizon, which itself
changes over time, interpretation must not "chase the phantom of an
historical object." 98 A text, then, is not meaningful "in itself," apart
from possible interpreters and their historical contexts. Nor is it mean-
ingful apart from the task of the interpreter. Gadamer argues, follow-
ing Aristotle, that one does not "understand" a text in the abstract,
without an "application" of the text to a specific problem. 99 American
pragmatism, also influenced by Aristotle, complements this hermeneu-
tic insight. Reasoning in human affairs does not seek abstract answers,
but concretely useful results. Theories of reasoning, for James, are
simply "mental modes of adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or
gnostic answers."100
Consider Weber in this light. The interpretive process is creative,
not mechanical. Viewed in the context of the complex goals of the Civil
Rights Act and subsequent difficulties in implementation, making sense
of the statute's command not to "discriminate" requires much more
than finding a meaning for the term. Even if the interpretive process
were viewed as retrieving the answer Congress would have reached in
1964 (had it deliberated on the issue), the inquiry involves "imagina-
94. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 263. Gadamer explicitly ties this
insight to judicial interpretation of statutes. See id. at 289-95.
95. Id. at 273. This central feature of Gadamerian hermeneutics is discussed more ex-
tensively in G. WARNKE, supra note 5, at 68-69, 103-04;J. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 5, at 156-
57, 183-84, 210-12.
96. "Preunderstandings" is our translation of Gadamer's phrase "l'orurieil," which can
also be translated as "prejudgment" or "prejudice." Our preunderstandings are the (usually)
unconscious structures of thought and attitude that we bring to interpretation.
97. See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 264-65:
Time is no longer primarily a gulf to be bridged .... It is not a yawning abyss, but is
filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which all that is
handed down presents itself to us. Here it is not too much to speak of a genuine
productivity of process.
98. Id. at 267.
99. Id. at 274-78, 289-305.
100. W. JAMES, supra note 6, at 194.
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tive" work by the judge. These lessons of Weber are consistent with the
insights of modem literary theory, historiography, and philosophy:
There is no interpretation without an interpreter, and the interpreter
will interact with the text or historical event. Just as the interpreter
learns from the text and history, so too does she speak to it.101 What
was decisive in Weber, surely to Justice Blackmun and probably to other
Justices in the majority as well, was what the interpreters learned about
the statute from considering the facts of the case: More than a decade
after the statute was enacted there were only 2 percent blacks in the
craft workforce, contrasted with 39 percent blacks in the overall
workforce.
Second, because this creation of statutory meaning is not a mechani-
cal operation, it often involves the interpreter's choice among several
competing answers. Although the interpreter's range of choices is
somewhat constrained by the text, the statute's history, and the circum-
stances of its application, the actual choice will not be "objectively" de-
terminable; interpretation will often depend upon political and other
assumptions held byjudges. Under Gadamer's fusion of horizons met-
aphor, interpretation seeks "to make the law concrete in each specific
case," and "[tihe creative supplementing of the law that is involved is a
task that is reserved to thejudge."' 0 2 As a practical matter, how could
it be otherwise? Many statutes leave key terms ambiguous, often inten-
tionally,10 3 and thereby delegate rulemaking authority to courts or
agencies.10 4 Over time, these ambiguities and unanswered questions
multiply, as society changes and background legal assumptions change
with it. Hermeneutics suggests that as the interpreter's own back-
ground context-her "tradition"-changes, so too will her interpretive
choices.
Consider Bob Jones in this light. The exemption for "charitable" in-
stitutions is a broad legislative message whose specific implementation
has been left to the IRS. In the early twentieth century, when Plessy was
still good law, it might have been appropriate to include segregated
academies among the institutions that receive the exemption. But in
the Brown era, our society's commitment to racial and ethnic integration
put pressure on the IRS to rethink the application of the exemption to
institutions that perpetuated segregation. The IRS for several years
left in place an interpretation that allowed the exemption for such insti-
tutions. But the background tradition-and the political context-was
101. See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 330-41.
102. Id. at 294.
103. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988) (Sher-
man Act); ef. R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 294-315 (at least half of federal courts' statutory
interpretation cases involve statutes that are so broadly phrased as to leave most policy details
to courts); Kousser, supra note 30, at 361-63.
104. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984); see also Edward Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369 (1989).
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changing dramatically in that period, and those changes eventually im-
pelled the IRS to change its position in 1970 and 1971. When the
Supreme Court sustained that decision in Bob Jones, it too was making a
practical judgment-that the national policy against racial discrimina-
tion outweighs the reliance interests built around the earlier interpreta-
tion, and that the political system had acquiesced in the new IRS
position. There are good arguments against this interpretation of the
statute in Bob Jones, and many of them are set forth in Justice Rehn-
quist's dissenting opinion. But, as Justice Powell suggested in his con-
curring opinion, 05 the Court's political judgment was a defensible one,
even if not the inevitable one. One's view of the correctness of the
Court's decision is strongly influenced by one's views about the breadth
of Brown, the deference courts should show to the agency, and other
political preunderstandings. However one votes in a case like Bob Jones,
one is making a political choice, or, more accurately, a cluster of
choices.
Third, when statutory interpreters make these choices, they are nor-
mally not driven by any single value-adhering to majoritarian com-
mands or encouraging private reliance on statutory texts or finding the
best answer according to modem policy-but are instead driven by
multiple values. Both hermeneutics and pragmatism emphasize the
complex nature of human reasoning. When solving a problem, we tend
to test different solutions, evaluating each against a range of values and
beliefs we hold as important. The pragmatistic idea that captures this
concept is the "web of beliefs" metaphor.10 6 We all accept a number of
different values and propositions that, taken together, constitute a web
of intertwined beliefs about, for example, the role of statutes in our
public law. Each of us may accord different weight to the specific val-
ues, but almost no one excludes any of the important values altogether.
Decisionmaking is, therefore, polycentric, and thus cannot be linear
and purely deductive. Instead, it is spiral and inductive: We consider
the consistency of the evidence for each value before reaching a final
decision, and even then check our decision against the values we es-
teem the most. Given this web of beliefs and the spiral form of deci-
sionmaking, an individual's reasoning will depend very much on the
context of the case at hand, and specifically on the relative strength of
each consideration.
Consider Griffin from the perspective of the web metaphor. A Jus-
tice who is a thoroughgoing textualist would surely agree with the Grif-
fin result, given the relative clarity of the statutory language. But so
could an intentionalist Justice: Although there is no smoking gun in
the legislative history, the legislative context and the strong statutory
105. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 606-12 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
106. See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
132-36 (1985); W.V. QUINE &J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970).
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language suggest that Congress would probably have favored substan-
tial punitive sanctions had it addressed the issue. And so could a
purposivistJustice, because surely one major purpose of the statute was
to deter employer misconduct, which the $302,000 award in Griffin
would seem to do. Even a Justice concerned only with fair results
might applaud the Griffin result. In fact, seven Justices of differing juris-
prudential stripes formed the majority in Griffin, andJustice Rehnquist's
opinion justified the result by arguing from the relatively clear statutory
language, 10 7 the original legislative intent, 108 the overall statutory pur-
pose, 10 9 and (to some extent) the reasonableness of the interpreta-
tion. 1 0 Whether ultimately correct, the opinion in Griffin, by its
strategy of cumulative assessment and weighing of factors potentially
relevant to interpretation, seems more persuasive than would any
foundationalist avenue to the same result." '
To illustrate the web metaphor in more detail, consider some varia-
tions on Griffin, and the potential response of Justices who sometimes
seem to adopt foundationalist approaches. Justice Brennan, the author
of Weber, might tentatively be identified as emphasizing dynamic
purposivist analysis in his opinions. 12 Justice Rehnquist's Weber dis-
sent and other opinions" 13 suggest that he normally emphasizes inten-
107. See Griffin, 458 U.S. at 570-71 ("[tlhe words chosen by Congress, given their plain
meaning, leave no room for the exercise of discretion" about the running of the penalty
period).
108. See id. at 570-74. Justice Rehnquist created a presumption about legislative intent
based on the clear statutory language: "Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and
where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, 'that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.'" Id. at 570 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). He then analyzed the legislative history and concluded
that it supported this assessment about congressional intent. See id. at 572-74.
109. Based on statutory language, legislative history, and statutory background, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that "although the sure purpose of the statute is remedial, Congress
has chosen to secure that purpose through the use of potentially punitive sanctions designed
to deter negligent or arbitrary delays in payment." Id. at 572.
110. In response to the argument that the Court's interpretation was absurd and unjust,
and therefore could not have been intended by Congress,Justice Rehnquist asserted that the
interpretation furthered the protective purposes of the statute. He also stated, in essence,
that any unfairness in the result was for Congress, not the courts, to remedy. See id. at 574-76.
In fact, although Justice Rehnquist did not note it, there is a good argument supporting the
reasonableness of the result in Griffin, which is discussed in text accompanying notes 63-70
supra.
111. We would disagree, then, with any reading of Griffin that attributes to it a rigid
foundationalist approach of textualism. Only parts of the opinion have that flavor, and we
agree with the outcome in the case despite our non-textualist orientation. At most, the opin-
ion may unduly stress the importance of the statutory language, but even then the opinion
sees the language as important at three levels (textualist, intentionalist, and purposivist).
112. See, e.g., Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989);
Houston v. Lack, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 2382-83 (1988); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct.
1811, 1819-31 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); Local
28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion).
113. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683
(1989); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
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tionalist considerations. Both joined the opinion in Griffin, which made
a fairly good case for consistency with the values of textualism, inten-
tionalism, purposivism, and current policy. Now assume that the statu-
tory text is quite clear, but the result is somewhat at odds with the
statute's overall purpose (which we narrow to that of compensating the
seaman). ChiefJustice Rehnquist would still vote for a bonus recovery:
Assuming the legislative history is neutral, he would follow the text be-
cause it is the best available evidence of legislative intent, and because
its other values (predictability and reliance) appeal to the ChiefJustice
more than the dynamic policy values of purposivism. At first blush, we
might expect Justice Brennan to dissent, based upon a Weber analysis.
But upon closer examination, we thinkJustice Brennan would probably
still support the Griffin result. To begin with, Justice Brennan would
consider the strength of the evidence of legislative purpose and the
clarity of the statute's language. If the statute is clear and the purpose
is debatable, it is unlikely that Justice Brennan would favor the latter.
Although he would vote to bend the language of a "clear" statute to
serve compelling public purposes (Bob Jones), Justice Brennan seems to
accept the values of textualism with enough enthusiasm to bow to the
clear text of Griffin -especially since the ultimate result, a large recov-
ery against a shipowner who apparently behaved squalidly, seems quite
fair.
14
Next assume that the statutory text in Griffin is truly ambiguous, that
the statute clearly indicates that its purpose is to penalize bad faith dis-
charges without pay, but that some legislative history suggests that
courts should not enter draconian recoveries. Justice Brennan would
still probably endorse the Griffin result. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's posi-
tion is not so clear, for it depends on the strength of the legislative
history. If he finds a detailed history which clearly endorses limits on
recovery or strongly assumes such limits, he will dissent, as he did in
Weber. But if, as is more likely, the legislative history is sparse and con-
tains only a few isolated statements to that effect, the ChiefJustice may
well vote withJustice Brennan. He will take comfort in the formal codi-
fication of the statutory purpose and, probably, also in the fairness of
penalizing the shipowner under these circumstances.' 15
In addition to the web of beliefs idea, two other metaphors, one
drawn from the pragmatist tradition and one drawn from the herme-
114. Justice Brennan has sometimes even adopted a textualist perspective-contra
Weber-in cases where a clear text supports a result at odds with contextual evidence and
policy considerations. See, e.g., Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989); Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308 (1988); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. ChiefJustice Rehnquist will sometimes disregard text or legislative history (but not
both) to reach results supported by current policy or fairness. See, e.g., United States Dep't of
Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1 (1988); Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 479 U.S. 442
(1987); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1987).
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neutical tradition, suggest more precisely how a practical reasoning ap-
proach would work. First, consider Peirce's contrast of the chain and
the cable.' 16 A chain is no stronger than its weakest link, because if any
of the singly connected links should break, so too will the chain. In
contrast, a cable's strength relies not on that of individual threads, but
upon their cumulative strength as they are woven together. Legal argu-
ments are often constructed as chains, but they tend to be more suc-
cessful when they are cable-like. The Court's opinion in Griffin draws its
strength from this phenomenon: The text, one probable purpose,
some legislative history, and current policy each lend some-even if not
unequivocal-support to the result. Each thread standing alone is sub-
ject to quarrel and objection; woven together, the threads persuaded
both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan, a not unimpressive
achievement.
In many cases of statutory interpretation, of course, the threads will
not all run in the same direction. The cable metaphor suggests that in
these cases the result will depend upon the strongest overall combina-
tion of threads. That, in turn, depends on which values the deci-
sionmakers find most important, and on the strength of the arguments
invoking each value. For most of the Supreme CourtJustices, a persua-
sive textual argument is a stronger thread than an otherwise equally
persuasive current policy or fairness argument, because of the reliance
and legislative supremacy values implicated in following the clear statu-
tory text.' 7 And a clear and convincing textual argument obviously
counts more than one beclouded with doubts and ambiguities.
Our model of practical reasoning in statutory interpretation is still
not complete, for it lacks a dynamic element that is intrinsic to human
reasoning in general, and interpretation in particular. The various ar-
guments (the threads of our cable) do not exist in isolation; they inter-
act with one another. A final metaphor that captures this interaction is
the "hermeneutical circle": A part can only be understood in the con-
text of the whole, and the whole cannot be understood without analyz-
ing its various parts.' 18 To interpret the statute in Griffin, for example,
the interpreter will look at the text and the legislative history and the
purpose and current values. But to evaluate the text, the interpreter
will consider it in light of the whole enterprise, including the history,
116. Peirce suggested that philosophy ought "to trust rather to the multitude and vari-
ety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a
chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so
slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected." C.S. PEIRCE, 5
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 6, para. 264.
117. Here, as throughout Part II, we are working from the Court's practice. The prefer-
ence for textual arguments over fairness arguments is itself a political choice the current
Court makes. We think the opposite choice-a good fairness argument is better than a good
textual one-is also politically defensible.
118. See generally H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 235-40, 258-67;
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 194-95 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans. 1962); D.
Hov, supra note 83.
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purpose, and current values. In other words, none of the interpretive
threads can be viewed in isolation, and each will be evaluated in its
relation to the other threads.
Following Heidegger, Gadamer deploys the hermeneutical circle in
a particularly interesting way, which roughly captures the dynamics of
legal interpretation. 1 9 Because we always approach texts from the
perspective of our own historically situated horizon, we tend to project
our "preunderstandings" onto the text, viewed as a whole. That is es-
sential to interpretation, because the preunderstandings are condi-
tioned by tradition and, hence, help us link our horizon with that of the
text. But the hermeneutical circle suggests that a true dialogue with the
text requires the interpreter to reconsider her preunderstandings as
she considers the specific evidence in the case, and then to formulate a
new understanding, which in turn is subject to reconsideration. For
Gadamer, the essential lesson of the circle metaphor is the hermeneuti-
cal attitude: "[A] person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to
tell him something." 120 The "to and fro movement" involved in the
hermeneutical circle is not just the interpreter's movement from a gen-
eral view of the statute to the specific evidence and back again; rather, it
requires her to test different understandings of the text in an ongoing
effort to determine its proper interpretation.
The positive metaphors of our analysis-the web of beliefs idea, the
cable-versus-chain contrast, and the hermeneutical circle-suggest the
contours of a practical reasoning model of statutory interpretation that
roughly captures the Court's practice. Our model holds that an inter-
preter will look at a broad range, of evidence-text, historical evidence,
and the text's evolution-and thus form a preliminary view of the stat-
ute. The interpreter then devel6ps that preliminary view by testing var-
ious possible interpretations against the multiple criteria of fidelity to
the text, historical accuracy, and conformity to contemporary circum-
stances and values. Each criterion is relevant, yet none necessarily
trumps the others. Thus while an apparently clear text, for example,
will create insuperable doubts for a contrary interpretation if the other
evidence reinforces it (Grfifin), an apparently clear text may yield if
other considerations cut against it (Bob Jones and Weber). As the inter-
preter comes to accept an interpretation (perhaps a confirmation of her
preliminary view), she considers a congeries of supporting arguments,
which may buttress her view much "like the legs of a chair and unlike
the links of a chain."' 121
119. See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 235-40, 261-67.
120. Id. at 238. "All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other
person or of the text. But this openness always includes our placing the other meaning in a
relation with the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in a relation to it." l
121. ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 156 (1982).
[Vol. 42:321
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This dialectical method of statutory interpretation, which is familiar
to us all,' 2 2 can be schematized as follows:
A PRACTICAL REASONING MODEL OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Most Abstract Current Policy
Inquiry 




Most Concrete Inquiry Statutory Text
As explained below, this model identifies the primary evidentiary
inquiries in which the Court will engage. 123 The model is, in crude
imagery, a "funnel of abstraction." It is funnel-shaped for three
reasons. First, the model suggests the hierarchy of sources that the
Court has in fact assumed. For example, in formulating her
preunderstanding of the statute and in testing it, the interpreter will
value more highly a good argument based on the statutory text than a
conflicting and equally strong argument based upon the statutory
purpose. Second, the model suggests the degree of abstraction at each
122. See Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason, supra note 3, at 1639-56 and sources discussed
therein; cf Posner, Skepticism, supra note 3 (thoughtful assessment of practical reason and con-
ventionalism in legal justification). As Frank Michelman has said:
Situated practical judgment seems always to involve a combination of something
general with something specific, endorsement of both a general standard and a spe-
cific application, or of both a general value and a specific means to its effectuation.
Judgment mediates between the general standard and the specific case. In order to
apply the standard in the particular context before us, we must interpret the stan-
dard. Every interpretation is a reconstruction of our sense of the standard's meaning
and rightness. This process, in which the meaning of the rule emerges, develops,
and changes in the course of applying it to cases is one that every common law prac-
titioner will immediately recognize.
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REv. 4, 28-29 (1986) (footnote omitted).
123. Apart from Griffin, other important Supreme Court opinions inspiring our funnel
include Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1796 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment); Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989) (Kennedy,J.);
United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468
(1989) (Stevens, J.); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988) (Brennan, J.)
United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 108 S. Ct. 1179 (1988) (Brennan, J.); Rose v. Rose, 481
U.S. 619 (1987) (Marshall, J.); id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Stevens,J.); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477
U.S. 207 (1986) (O'Connor, J.); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474
U.S. 494 (1986) (Powell, J.); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (Blackmun, J.);
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (Marshall, J.); Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S.
330 (1984) (Burger, C.J.); Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983) (excellent debate
between Marshall, J., for the Court, and Powell, J., dissenting); Jefferson County
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150 (1983) (Powell, J.); American Soc'y of
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source. The sources at the bottom of the diagram involve more
focused, concrete inquiries, typically with a more limited range of
arguments. As the interpreter moves up the diagram, a broader range
of arguments is available, partly because the inquiry is less concrete.
Third, the model illustrates the pragmatistic and hermeneutical insights
explained above: In formulating and testing her understanding of
the statute, the interpreter will move up and down the diagram,
evaluating and comparing the different considerations represented by
each source of argumentation. In what follows, we explain those
various considerations in greater detail.
A. Textual Considerations
Our practical reasoning model starts with the prevailing Supreme
Court assumption that the statutory text is the most authoritative inter-
pretive criterion. The text is most often the starting point for interpre-
tation, and textual arguments carry the greatest argumentative weight.
The Court's normative preference for text is a recognition of several
values. Formally, all that is enacted into law is the statutory text, and at
the very least legislative supremacy means that an interpreter must be
attentive to the text. Functionally, citizens and lawmakers will rely on
the apparent meaning of statutory texts. Textual primacy can also be a
useful concrete limit on judicial power.
Textual analysis starts with the specific words of the statutory provi-
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 505 (1982) (Blackmun, J.); American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982) (excellent debate between White, J., for the
Court, and Brennan & Stevens, JJ, dissenting); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981) (Rehnquist, J.); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers'
Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268 (1980) (excellent debate between Stevens, J., for the Court,
and Blackmun, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980)
(Burger, CJ.); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (PowellJ.); United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-16 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Stevens, J.); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205 (1979) (Stewart, J.); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978) (Burger, C.J.); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324-50 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978) (Brennan, J., for the Court, and Powell, J., concurring); United States v.
Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110 (1978) (Brennan, J.); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (excellent debate between Rehnquist, J., for the Court, and Brennan, J.,
dissenting); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (Marshall, J.);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Brennan, J.); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Stewart, J.); Connell Constr. Corp. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (Powell, J.); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975)
(Burger, C.J.); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703
(1974) (excellent debate between Powell, J., for the Court, and Marshall, J., dissenting); CBS
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (Burger, C.J.); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972) (Stewart, J.); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157 (1971) (Brennan, J.); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363
(1971) (WhiteJ.) (plurality opinion); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Burger,
C.J.); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Black, J.); Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S.
295 (1970) (Douglas, J.); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969) (Harlan, J.).
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sion being interpreted. The interpreter should approach the statutory
text as a reasonably intelligent reader would and give the text its most
commonsensical reading.1 24 That reading should be sensitive to any
special senses the words have acquired, and should also consider the
placement of words in the sentence, and even the punctuation of the
sentence.' 25 Textual analysis should further consider how the statutory
provision at issue coheres with the general structure of the statute,
since other provisions in the statute might shed light on the one being
interpreted. For example, the Weber opinion and dissent both focused
on section 703(j), a related provision of Title VII that limited the ability
of the statute to "require" affirmative action.1 26 In such instances, the
Court asks: Assuming that the statute should be read to make sense as
an integrated text, which interpretation best "fits" into the "whole stat-
ute"? 127 Indeed, the Court will sometimes look to similar provisions in
other statutes, especially those regulating similar things. Have the
words of the instant statute acquired a conventional meaning that we
ought to accept?1
28
These are just the main lines of textual inquiry, and they suggest
that in a great many cases several different interpretations may be tex-
tually justifiable. We believe Weber is such a case. While the Court
sometimes says that the discovery of a plain meaning ends the interpre-
tive inquiry,' 29 the Court's actual practice suggests that this is not usu-
ally the case, as Griffin and Bob Jones illustrate. 130 These cases suggest
124. A qualification is in order here. Highly technical statutes should not be read with
the "common sense" of the average person, but rather with the "common sense" of the spe-
cial audience to which the statute is addressed (such as gas and oil companies or tax lawyers).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1030-31 (1989); United
Say. Ass'n ofTexas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1987); Lukhard
v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987).
126. See 443 U.S. at 205-07 (Brennan, J., for the Court); id. at 244-47 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683
(1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988); Bethesda
Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399 (1988); United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484
U.S. 49 (1987).
128. See, e.g., TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989);
Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1546 (1988).
129. 'Judicial perception that a particular result would be unreasonable may enter into
the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what Congress has
plainly and intentionally provided." Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121
(1987) (per curiam). See, e.g., United States v. Providence Journal Co., 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988)
(Blackmun,J., for the Court); see also id. at 1511 (ScaliaJ., concurring); Burlington N. R.R. v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96
(1985). Note that even when the Court invokes the plain meaning rule, it will still usually look
at the legislative history. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S.
531 (1987); INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986).
130. See also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988) (where otherwise acceptable construction would cause
constitutional problems, the Court will construe to avoid them); United States v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 108 S. Ct. 1179, 1183-84 (1988) (exemption from "all taxation" held to be only exemp-
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that a clear textual meaning merely establishes a presumption that the
interpretation is correct. Usually that presumption will hold up upon
examination of other factors in the model, as it did in Griffin. Some-
times, though, the other factors will strongly cut against the apparent
meaning of the text, as in Bob Jones. If that occurs, the interpreter might
reevaluate her belief that the text is really all that clear and, in any
event, might be willing to override plain meaning to subserve the other
important values involved in statutory interpretation.
B. Historical Considerations
In accordance with the Court's practice, our practical reasoning
model also considers the original expectations of the Congress that en-
acted the statute. Original legislative expectations are important in a
democracy where the legislature is the primary source of lawmaking.
Evidence of the statute's background, together with the text, at least
suggests the original meaning of the statute. To the extent that the
Court can recover that original meaning, it subserves democratic values
by enforcing the law as the legislature understood it, thus limiting judi-
cial discretion and power. Moreover, citizens and policymakers often
rely on these original expectations, especially when they reflect careful
compromises. Historical considerations are more abstract and less au-
thoritative than textual evidence, however, for the reasons suggested in
Part I: The expectations and intentions of a large collection of people,
acting some time ago, are difficult to discover, and reliance on these
expectations is neither as reasonable nor as likely as reliance upon a
statute's text.
The most authoritative historical evidence is the legislative history
of the statute, because it is a contemporary record made by the enact-
ing legislators. In some instances, the legislative history may provide
an example or suggest an application that squarely fits a subsequent
interpretive problem. Crystal-clear legislative history on an interpre-
tive issue (a "smoking gun") is rare-and sometimes suspect, for it may
be the result of strategic behavior. If it is available, however, and if it
reinforces the apparent meaning of statutory language, that will proba-
bly be decisive in most cases 13 - indeed, such cases would usually not
be worth litigating. On the other hand, clear legislative history will not
be decisive if the statutory text is genuinely ambiguous, or if it supports
the opposite interpretation. In such cases, the clarity of the legislative
tion from direct taxation); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (Court looked to history
of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judgments); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (after discovering "natural meaning" of statutory language, Court
continued to analyze legislative history and purposes); and cases cited in note 92 supra.
131. "[I]f an intent clearly expressed in committee reports is within the permissible lim-
its of the [statutory] language and no construction manifestly more reasonable suggests itself,
a court does pretty well to read the statute to mean what the few legislators having the great-
est concern with it said it meant to them." HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the
Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 216 (1967).
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history may be only illusory, or else trumped up to skew the interpre-
tive process.' 3 2 This precept reflects the second-best status of legisla-
tive history as an interpretive guide. Unlike the statutory text, it was
not enacted into law, and giving conclusive effect to clear legislative
history when statutory language is ambiguous or vague is in tension
with Article I requirements. It also may threaten to promote rent-seek-
ing by private interests, who will often find it easier to insert evidence
of private-interest deals in the legislative history than in the statutory
language, thus making it less likely that the legislature will recognize
and fight against the deal in the legislative arena. 133 Thus, even crystal-
clear legislative history will not always control interpretation, and in
any event other potential interpretive sources will be considered.
The interpreter will also consider Judge Posner's more general
technique of imaginative reconstruction. 134 There are two potential in-
quiries. When no specific legislative history addresses an issue, the in-
terpreter will, with Judge Posner, ask what the enacting legislature,
lacking foresight of the future, probably would have thought about the
issue before the Court. Relevant evidence would include common law
rules when the statute was enacted, general assumptions of law held by
the enacting Congress, and contemporary statutes enacted on related
subjects.1 35 Another, more subtle, way of posing the question is to ask
what the legislature would have done had it possessed the foresight to
anticipate what has actually happened since the statute was enacted.
Both approaches may be necessary to pay due respect to the enacting
legislature. The first inquiry is simply a second-best surrogate for miss-
ing specific legislative intent. The second inquiry, which the interpreter
should perform whether or not she can discern either a specific or hy-
pothetical original intent, recognizes that statutory enactment is part of
the ongoing process of public law, not a static, isolated act. By chang-
ing existing law or making new law, an enacting legislature admits by its
very act that law must sometimes be altered to meet changing condi-
tions; it would be unreasonable to assume that legislators intended to
cast their original understanding in stone. As time passes after the stat-
utory enactment, we think this first inquiry deserves less, and the sec-
132. For an instance in which such clear legislative history was rejected, apparently be-
cause of its suspect character, see Monterey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Re-
view Comm'n, 743 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1984) (committee chairman's report addressing specific
point at issue was outweighed by the silence otherwise expressed on the matter).
133. See Macey, supra note 44.
134. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
135. For examples of imaginative reconstruction, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 39-45,
66-84 (1983) (interesting debate between Justice Brennan, for the Court, and Justice Rehn-
quist, dissenting, over the common law punitive damages rule in 1871); Leo Sheep Co. v.
United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (thorough background analysis of railroad land grant stat-
utes of the 1860s); Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091-93 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (reconstructing what Congress would have de-
cided); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1946) (L. Hand,
J.), aff'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
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ond inquiry more, weight.136
The next interpretive focus is legislative purpose, the legal process
inquiry. The counterfactual assumptions underlying this approach-
that statutes are conclusively presumed to be purposive acts, that legis-
lators are reasonable people pursuing the public interest in reasonable
fashion-make this approach too abstract to be a controlling theory of
statutory interpretation. Recall the difficulty we had in figuring out the
primary statutory purposes in Weber, Griffin, and Bob Jones. Yet these
very assumptions, coupled with purposivism's focus upon statutory
context, help locate statutes on the surrounding legal and social ter-
rain, and enable them to evolve along with society and the social prob-
lem the statute originally addressed.
As traditional legal process thought employed it, purposivist analy-
sis is inherently ambiguous. Obviously, the interpreter is interested in
the original legislative purpose or purposes: What problem was Con-
gress was trying to solve, and what general goals did it set forth in try-
ing to solve it? Sometimes this inquiry is fairly determinate. Other
times, as in Weber, Griffin, and Bob Jones, it is difficult, because several
original purposes are apparent, and they push the interpreter in differ-
ent directions. In these instances, the inquiry goes beyond the original
purposes and asks, as the Court did in Weber, what purpose the inter-
preter should "attribute" to the statute. This attribution of purpose
will inevitably be influenced by the interpreter's current context and
the evolution of the statute over time.
C. Evolutive Considerations
Our final two inquiries, based upon the Court's practice, follow
from the dynamic purpose analysis suggested above. These are highly
abstract inquiries having less connection to text and legislative expecta-
tions, and hence less authority in a democracy. Yet these inquiries are
pertinent, because the enactment of statutes is part of a dynamic
process.1 3
7
136. This second version of imaginative reconstruction resembles the suggestion that an
intentionalist approach should consider not only the interpretation's consistency with original
legislative intent, but also its consequences. This is so because "[r]ational decisionmaking
under uncertainty requires that we take those consequences into account in choosing between
risky alternatives." Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 462. By asking how the
enacting legislature would answer the interpretive question if given knowledge of contempo-
rary circumstances, the second variety of imaginative reconstruction allows statutes to evolve
in light of how that legislature, and not simply the current Court, would probably evaluate the
modem context. This focus helps differentiate the second version of imaginative reconstruc-
tion from other evolutive inquiries discussed in text accompanying notes 137-143 infra. The
importance of the second version of imaginative reconstruction overtakes that of the first ver-
sion as the statute ages, because the social circumstances the statute encounters become in-
creasingly further removed from the original expectations of the enacting legislature.
137. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged at least some of the dynamic quality of statutory
interpretation that we attempt to capture in our funnel of abstraction when he wrote that
"[the meaning of... a statute cannot be gained by confining inquiry within its four comers.
Only the historic process of which such legislation is an incomplete fragment-that to which it
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The enactment of a statute is often the beginning of a significant
process of implementation by courts or agencies. Implementation
changes the statute, because the statute must be applied-and often
subtly redirected-to meet variations of the problem not originally an-
ticipated. For example, when it enacted Title VII, Congress assumed
that outlawing color-conscious employment decisions would actually
produce equal employment opportunities for blacks. The problem was
not so easy to solve, however. Blacks continued to be under-
represented in the skilled workforce, at least partly because of covert
discrimination and the ongoing effects of past discrimination. Thus the
Court concluded in Weber that if the nation were to realize Title VII's
goal of providing jobs for blacks, it would have to relax the require-
ment of color-blindness. Weber is therefore a clear example of a case in
which the Court interprets a statute to take into account evolutive con-
siderations, or social and legal circumstances not anticipated when the
statute was enacted.
Finally, statutory interpretation will consider current values, such as
ideas of fairness, related statutory policies, and (most important) con-
stitutional values. In Bob Jones, where the plain meaning of the statutory
text undercut the Court's interpretation and the historical evidence was
ambiguous, the fact that constitutional values supported denying the
tax exemption was crucial to the decision.' 38 All but the most ardent
textualist will probably admit that even clear statutes should not be in-
terpreted to reach "absurd results"; clear inconsistency with current
values, we argue, is akin to absurdity. Consideration of these values has
in fact exercised an important gravitational pull in statutory cases. 139
gave rise as well as that which gave rise to it-can yield its true meaning." United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Similarly, J. Willard Hurst has
said:
[Statutory] text derives its vitality in part from its past-from the prior state of the
law and the shortcomings of that state of law. The text derives its vitality in part
from its future-from what those charged with applying it do to give it force, not
only to promote its objectives but to overcome contrivances to evade its mandates.
The statutory text is central and commands deference. But to grasp the full reality of
its impact we should see it as part of a flow of policy-making activity.
J. HURST, supra note 9, at 41.
138. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Religion & Public Policy: Bob Jones
University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. I.
139. Indeed, the Court uses the traditional canons of statutory interpretation to create
policy presumptions. See generally W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 655-89; Es-
kridge, supra note 85; Cass Sunstein, Interpreting the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. -
(1990) (forthcoming). For example, the rule of lenity indicates that doubts about the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved against criminal liability. Other substantive canons of
interpretation presume against statutory interpretations that create constitutional problems
for the statute, derogate from traditional executive or judicial functions, invade local matters
traditionally left to state regulation, violate international law and treaties, or penalize Native
Americans. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 658-76.
The Court also adverts to a number of procedural canons of interpretation, under which
judges must defer to other decisionmakers. The main example is the canon of deference to
agency interpretations of their operative statutes. Thus, when a statute contemplates that the
primary interpretive responsibility rests with an agency, the court must limit its judgment to
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This last statement might seem surprising, since traditional founda-
tionalist theories have emphasized original intent and plain meaning,
and tended to suppress current policy. Yet legal hermeneutics and
pragmatism readily question whether it is possible for interpreters to
avoid the influence of current concerns. If interpretation is (as
Gadamer puts it) a "fusion of horizons," and one of the horizons is that
of a present interpreter, then current policies and values will inevitably
be important to the dialectic of interpretation. If human reasoning
seeks (as James puts it) to ascertain the "cash value" of various answers,
their practical value in solving today's problems, then current policies
and values will naturally be considered. One of us has argued that
evolutive concerns, especially current policies, are important to statu-
tory interpretation.140 And, notwithstanding the rhetoric in some of its
opinions, the Supreme Court seems to agree. Concurring opinions in
Weber and Bob Jones openly announced reliance on then-current val-
ues, 14 1 and the Court relies on current values and policies in a wide
variety of other cases.
142
While our practical reasoning model is a descriptive synthesis of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, a classic example of its method can be
found in a very old case--Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. 143
The chur'ch had hired an English clergyman and agreed to provide for
his transportation to the United States, in apparent violation of the
plain language of the following federal criminal statute:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corpo-
whether the agency's interpretation is "unreasonable," not whether it is the same as the inter-
pretation the Court itself would have reached.
140. See Eskridge, supra note 3; see also ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE:
REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 94-97 (1969); Aleinikoff, supra note 85, at 46-61; Farber & Frickey,
Legislative Intent, supra note 3; Robert A. Leflar, Statutory Construction: The Sound Law Approach, in
RUGGERO ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177-80 (1976).
141. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 606-12 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. See Eskridge, supra note 3. Most of the cases cited as inspirations for our descriptive
model implicitly or explicitly consider evolutive arguments. See note 123 supra. For other
recent examples, see Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989)
(deferring to revised agency rules based on statutory purposes); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. 1775, 1796-1806 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (statute
evolves to meet practical problems of proof); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S.
Ct. 1698, 1706-07 (1989) (evolving principles of intergovernmental tax immunity influence
interpretation of statute); TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225
(1989) (borrowing line of NLRA cases to update Railway Labor Act); City of Canton v. Harris,
109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989) (developing policy from precedent, not from statute or its original
history); Mesa v. California, 109 S. Ct. 959, 968-69 (1989) (dynamic use of policy canons of
construction); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 954-56 (1989) (common
law of trusts as basis for dynamic interpretation); Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S.
Ct. 2641, 2648-53 (1989) (borrowing line of NLRA cases to update RLA); Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1523 (1988) (inherently dynamic nature of Sher-
man Act); EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988) (updating statute to avoid first amendment problems); Forrester v.
White, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988) (common law, constitutional analogues, purpose analysis used to
update statute).
143. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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ration, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in
any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien
or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its Terri-
tories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol
or special, express or implied, made previous to the importation or mi-
gration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform la-
bor or service of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or the
District of Columbia.
144
The statutory prohibition against employment contracts facilitating im-
migration is very broad and filled with loophole-plugging language.
Elsewhere the statute exempted specific occupations from the prohibi-
tion, and clergy were not among these occupations.' 4 5 Hence, the
Court conceded, with some understatement, that the government's tex-
tual argument had "great force."' 14 6 Yet the Court refused to rest its
decision on the apparent meaning of the statutory text, instead evaluat-
ing the text against other evidence. The title of the statute and its legis-
lative background suggested that the purpose of the statute was to limit
the supply of "cheap, unskilled labor" into the United States. "It was
never suggested that we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers,"
the Court remarked. 147 Under these circumstances, excluding the
Christian minister-a "brain toiler"-would not subserve the statutory
purpose.
Yet Holy Trinity Church found the purposivist argument no more dis-
positive than the textual arguments. Instead, the Court examined other
historical and current policy arguments to test its tentative conclusion
that "brain toilers" were not within the statutory prohibition. First, the
Court relied on specific legislative history. The House report sup-
ported the Court's attribution of purpose, and the Senate committee
report suggested that it would have preferred that the law specify
"manual labor" rather than "labor and service" as the object of the
prohibition, had it not feared the bill's passage would be slowed by the
amendment.' 4 8 The Court's analysis closed by invoking a current pol-
icy value. The government's literalist approach threatened the societal
value of religious freedom-and the idea of the United States as a
"Christian nation." 149 Given the public interest in favor of religious
freedom, the Court refused to attribute to Congress any intention to
discourage immigration of Christian ministers into this country.
Holy Trinity Church is a classic critique of naive textualism. When
generalized, the critique illustrates the operation of our practical rea-
144. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, repealed by Act ofJune 27, 1952, ch.
477, § 403(a)(2), 66 Stat. 279-80.
145. See id. § 5 (excepting professional actors, artists, lecturers, and singers, among
others).
146. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459.
147. Id. at 464.
148. See id. at 464-65.
149. Id. at 470-71.
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soning model. According to the model, the text of the statute
powerfully supports the government's position, creating a strong pre-
sumption for that interpretation. But the apparent meaning of the text
becomes less clear when we consider the statute's purpose and legisla-
tive history, and test that meaning against background social values.
This evidence suggested an alternative reading to the Court, one that
emphasized the value of religious freedom, and the Court's faith in this
as a "Christian nation." 150 The values of textualism seem little im-
paired by this reading, and the Court appears admirably sensitive to
legislative expectations. The Court's opinion may be more persuasive
because it weaves different arguments together to present powerful
reasons for rethinking the apparent meaning of the bare text. 15 1
III. USING PRACTICAL REASONING TO EVALUATE THE SUPREME
COURT'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DECISIONS
Part I demonstrated several fundamental problems with each of the
primary foundationalist theories of statutory interpretation. The
Supreme Court, we argued, recognizes these weaknesses at least im-
plicitly, as its unwillingness to rely consistently upon any one of the
foundationalist theories suggests. Part II offered a practical reasoning
150. See id. at 464-72. Concededly, the Court's opinion used this backdrop of religious
freedom, together with legislative history, to bolster its argument that Congress could not
have intended to outlaw what the church had done. Thus this value might be seen as relevant
only to the question of statutory intent and purpose. Yet the overall thrust of the opinion, as
stated at the outset, is that courts should avoid the literal interpretation of a statute if that
would be an "absurd result." See id. at 460. On this score, the opinion reduces to the follow-
ing syllogism: (1) courts should avoid absurd interpretations of a statute; (2) in American
society, it would be absurd to make criminal what the church had done; (3) therefore, the
statute was not violated. By equating what the legislators did not intend with what American
society would consider absurd, and by assuming the judicial authority to assess how society
would evaluate the statute, the Court in effect said that judicially construed societal values can
trump "clear" statutory language. That the legislative intent invoked by the Court is in par.t
actually ajudicially constructed sense of societal values is made clear in the last two sentences
of the opinion:
It is a case where there was presented a definite evil, in view of which the legislature
used general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases of that evil, and thereaf-
ter, unexpectedly, it is developed that the general language thus employed is broad
enough to reach cases and acts which the whole history and life of the country affirm
could not have been intentionally legislated against. It is the duty of the courts,
under those circumstances, to say that, however broad the language of the statute
may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the intention of the legisla-
ture, and therefore cannot be within the statute.
Id. at 472.
151. The Holy Trinity Church "purpose" or "spirit" methodology recently came under
attack in a specially concurring opinion ofJustice Kennedy. See Public Citizen v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2576 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ. and
O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy complained generally that "the
problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the views of the world whence they came
than the views of those who seek their advice," id., and in particular, he suggested that the
Court in Holy Trinity Church simply substituted its "Christian nation" values for those of Con-
gress. As the text demonstrates, however, we find in Holy Triniy Church a much richer combi-
nation of arguments supporting its holding. The opinion's unfortunate genuflections toward
Christianity should not obscure its central message.
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model as a more subtle description of the Supreme Court's approach to
statutory decisions. We argued further that our model is theoretically
attractive, because it not only draws upon our reading of the Court's
vast array of statutory interpretation decisions, but also seems consis-
tent with modern theories of interpretation and reasoning.' 5 2 Herme-
neutics, for example, suggests that an interpreter cannot escape the
pull and influence of various types of arguments, evolutive as well as
textual and historical. And pragmatism, we claimed, suggests that in-
terpreters will generally be persuaded by the arguments that best fit the
interpreter's web of beliefs and values. Our practical reasoning model
mixes inductive and deductive problem-solving techniques, evaluates
various arguments according to their "cash value" in the web of beliefs
embraced by the interpretive community, and considers the complete
textual, historical, and evolutive context of the statutory provision be-
ing interpreted.
Our inquiry in this part will have a different focus. Assuming the
descriptive accuracy of our funnel-shaped model, we shall use it as a
framework from which one can evaluate the Court's practice in statu-
tory cases. There are at least two ways to criticize the Court within this
framework. One way is to accept the framework and to analyze the
Court's thoroughness and persuasiveness in considering the various
factors and in making political choices in the cases. Another way is to
question the Court's apparent hierarchy of values that underlie the fun-
nel-shaped model.
Specifically, our practical reasoning model allows us to evaluate the
Supreme Court's candor in statutory interpretation. If, as we suggest,
the Court ordinarily applies practical reasoning to the interpretation of
statutes, does the Court do so carefully and persuasively? Do its opin-
ions adequately reflect that process of practical reasoning? Unhappily,
they often do not. Indeed, the Court's opinions show a distressing ten-
dency to overstate the case for the result that a majority of the Justices
prefer, and to suppress the legitimate arguments cutting in a different
direction. This is distressing, because the full advantages of a practical
reasoning approach cannot be realized without a candid "to and fro"
play among the various interpretive considerations, as Gadamer's ac-
count of the hermeneutical attitude suggests. We explore this problem
in the first section of this part.
Our model also serves as a framework by which to evaluate the
Court's consideration of various interpretive factors. In our view, the
Court often gives too much weight to historical factors and rigid textual
readings. Even in instances where evolutive considerations were prob-
ably decisive to the outcome, the Court's opinions frequently submerge
152. We have previously addressed many of the policy and constitutional arguments that
might be raised against our position. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 3; Farber & Frickey, Legisla-
live Intent, supra note 3.
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these factors and sound more "archaeological"' 15 3 than was the deci-
sionmaking process that likely produced the result. In other instances,
the Court's neglect of evolutive factors seems to make a difference in
the result as well as the opinion. We explore this phenomenon in the
second section of this part.
These two observations-the Court's tendency to overstate argu-
ments supporting its results and to understate the importance of evolu-
tive factors-are related to one another, and related to what must be
the primary reason for the continuing appeal of foundationalist theo-
ries of statutory interpretation: The Court remains insecure in the le-
gitimacy of its statutory interpretations. To justify such interstitial
lawmaking, the Court feels it must establish a compelling case for the
interpretation based upon "objective" evidence, preferably tied to leg-
islative (majoritarian) expectations. This observation is neither new
nor striking, and we do not linger on it.
What we do develop is the thesis that this "counter-majoritarian
anxiety" in statutory interpretation, so obviously related to similar inse-
curities in constitutional decisionmaking, might be relieved by examin-
ing similar issues in other disciplines, especially philosophy and
historiography. Like law, these disciplines have traditionally sought
certitude through demonstrations that conclusions rest upon "objec-
tive" foundations and are thus not vulnerable to the accusations of
"subjectivism" and "relativism." Inspired by both the hermeneutical
and pragmatic traditions, however, modem philosophers and historians
have attacked this traditional opposition and have sought, in Richard
Bernstein's words, to move "beyond objectivism and relativism"' 154 to-
ward a dialogic understanding of human knowledge. Statutory inter-
pretation ought to make a similar movement, acknowledging that to
admit that legal interpretations often cannot be established according
to clear objective criteria is not to bestow upon the judge uncon-
strained freedom to reach any interpretation she desires. If performed
candidly and with empathetic appreciation for the point of view of
others (the classic assumptions of hermeneutics), the to and fro move-
ment among the considerations suggested by our practical reasoning
model is a more legitimate approach to statutory interpretation than
the supposedly "objective" foundationalist approaches.
A. Internal Critique of the Court's Practical Reasoning
Parts I and II of this article suggest that the Supreme Court has not
embraced, and ought not embrace, any one foundationalist method of
statutory interpretation. We argued that the best way to understand
the corpus of Supreme Court opinions is to view them as applications
of our practical reasoning approach, as Griffin and Holy Trinity Church
153. See Aleinikoff, supra note 85.
154. R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM, supra note 8.
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illustrate. Although our model captures what the Supreme Court actu-
ally does in statutory interpretation cases, we readily concede that many
of the Court's written decisions seem to adopt one of the foundational-
ist approaches. This is only superficially disturbing to our thesis, be-
cause decisions typically cited as examples of literalism (Griffin) or
purposivism (Weber) are in fact much more complicated in their reason-
ing. Our thesis is bolstered by the observation that, even if these deci-
sions were read to endorse foundationalist approaches, they adopt
diferent foundationalist approaches. For every case that might be cited
for a purposivist approach (Weber), there is a counter-case that might be
cited for a textualist approach (Griffin). When these cases are read care-
fully, and especially when they are read together with similar cases over
time, one realizes that they do not stand for any foundationalist ap-
proach, but instead are more naturally explained by our model of prac-
tical reasoning. One critical suggestion we derive from Parts I and II is
that the Court should abandon its foundationalist rhetoric, because it
only impedes an understanding of how the Court actually engages in
statutory interpretation.
An equally distressing phenomenon is that even when the Court ex-
plicitly considers the various factors of practical reasoning, it often
treats interpretive considerations mechanically and suppresses oppos-
ing evidence. The Court's written opinions in statutory cases are often
wooden or one-sided: The Court unrealistically asserts that all of the
interpretive factors support the Court's interpretation or are at least
neutral; very often the Court simply ignores those considerations that
point in a different direction. This style of suppressing disagreement
defeats the whole purpose of practical reasoning, that of understanding
opposing evidence and trying to derive a practical solution in the spe-
cific case at hand. The hermeneutical play between interpreter and text
does not occur when the interpreter fails to give herself over to the to
and fro movement, in which all useful and relevant evidence is consid-
ered, and disagreement is embraced rather than suppressed. Of
course, disagreement is not entirely suppressed by a one-sided opinion,
for it typically provokes an equally one-sided dissent. We think it bet-
ter, however, for eachJustice to recognize the complexities of his or her
position, and for the Court as a whole to write opinions that better re-
flect the complex decisionmaking process.
Weber is a classic example of this problem. Justice Brennan's opin-
ion for the Court purports to demonstrate that original congressional
expectations justify an interpretation permitting affirmative action
under Title VII. But the words Congress chose for Title VII do not
readily suggest that Congress in 1964 approved of affirmative action or
even thought much about it, and Justice Brennan's opinion refuses
even to attempt to identify any ambiguity in the statutory text that cuts
against his interpretation. Nor does the opinion concede that much of
the legislative history, meticulously collected injustice Rehnquist's dis-
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sent, speaks against Justice Brennan's interpretation as well. Instead,
the opinion deflects attention from those factors by blandly invoking
the maxim that an interpretation should be accepted if it is within the
"spirit," even if not the letter, of the statute. 155 The opinion appeals to
one purpose of the statute-ensuring more jobs for blacks-without
recognizing that another purpose of the statute-encouraging color-
blind decisions-cuts against the Court's interpretation. Overall, Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion is supported more by assertion than by a careful
review of the many pieces of evidence.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Weber does not adequately articulate
the practical reasoning that ultimately does support his conclusion, be-
cause it treats the various interpretive factors selectively and somewhat
capriciously, and fails to acknowledge the force of current values and
policies that must have influenced the result. Neither is Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent a paradigm for a decision grounded in practical reason,
however, for his attack on the majority itself rests upon an overstated
view of the evidence l5 6 and on a selective analysis of the important in-
terpretive factors. It is the concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun that
best suggests at least some of the practical considerations that probably
swung a majority of the Justices to the Weber result. Justice Blackmun
refreshingly admitted that the historical evidence canvassed in the dis-
senting opinion had great force, and declined to find much determinate
meaning in either the text or the purpose of the statute. Rather, Justice
Blackmun considered unforeseen developments since 1964 and con-
cluded that it would be practically unfair to employers and unions-and
the beneficiaries of Title VII-not to allow voluntary affirmative action
in some circumstances.
1 5 7
Weber is not unusual. Our complaints that both majority and dis-
senting opinions seem to (but only seem to) submerge the various inter-
155. Justice Brennan noted that Weber's argument rested upon "a literal interpreta-
tion" of §§ 703(a) and (d) and did acknowledge that the argument was "not without force."
But he found the argument "misplaced," because of the .'familiar rule, that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
the intention of its makers.'" 443 U.S. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity Church). Note that the
opinion nowhere suggests any ambiguity in §§ 703(a) and (d) or why, if there is no ambiguity,
the spirit of the statute should have controlled over its plain meaning. Yet, later in the opin-
ion, Justice Brennan inconsistently invoked the plain meaning approach to trump an argu-
ment based on statutory purpose. Section 703(6) provides that nothing in the statute "shall be
interpreted to require any employer" to engage in affirmative action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)
(1982) (emphasis added). The seemingly color-blind spirit of this provision was irrelevant,
Justice Brennan claimed, because
[h]ad Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action .... it easily
could have ... provid[ed] that Title VII would not require orpermit racially preferen-
tial integration efforts .... The section does not state that "nothing in Title VII shall
be interpreted to permit" voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances.
The natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-con-
scious affirmative action.
443 U.S. at 205-06 (emphasis in original).
156. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 324-26.
157. 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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pretive factors in favor of one overriding consideration, and fail to
acknowledge the complexity of the evidence, are equally applicable to
other statutory interpretation opinions,1 58 including Bob Jones.' 59 In
many more cases, the Court explicitly examines the many considera-
tions that our practical reasoning model suggests, but examines the evi-
dence in questionable ways. Recall that our descriptive model finds
that the Court will make political choices. If that is true, it may make
poor political choices and render ill-informed statutory judgments. An
example of this is the Court's recent opinion in McNally v. United
States. 16
0
McNally interpreted the federal mail fraud statute, which criminal-
izes "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises" using the federal mails.' 61 The Court held that the "fraud"
prohibited in the statute is limited to schemes to deprive others of
money and other property rights and does not include schemes to de-
prive others of "intangible rights," such as the right of the citizenry to
fiduciary honesty on the part of public officials. The Court's opinion
tracks the considerations outlined in our model of practical reasoning.
As first enacted in 1872, the mail fraud statute was aimed at "thieves,
forgers, and rapscallions... deceiving and fleecing the innocent people
in the country."' 162 From that the Court concluded that "the original
impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect the people from
schemes to deprive them of their money or property." 163 According to
the Court, the statutory text confirms this interpretation, because the
key term "to defraud" has traditionally (in 1872 as well as in this cen-
tury) been limited to "'wronging one in his property rights by dishon-
est methods or schemes.' "164 Further confirmation of this
interpretation was the judicially ascribed statutory " 'purpose of pro-
tecting the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil' " peo-
158. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Chan v. Korean
Airlines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment
Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404 (1988); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); Soren-
son v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986); Bankamerica Corp. v. United States,
462 U.S. 122 (1983).
159. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court all but ignored the plain meaning of
the statutory language and the history of the statute and seized upon an oversimplified pur-
pose analysis. 461 U.S. at 577-605. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which is analytically quite
powerful, is also somewhat one-sided, as it slights the dynamic purpose and constitutional
policy ramifications of the statute. Id. at 612-23. The concurring opinion ofJustice Powell is
candid about the strength of arguments on both sides and is an eloquent testament to the
persuasiveness of evolutive and practical factors. Id. at 606-12.
160. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
162. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks ofRep. Farnsworth), quoted
in MnVally, 483 U.S. at 356.
163. McNaly, 483 U.S. at 356.
164. Id. at 358 (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
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ple of their money and property. 165 The Court also traced the
evolution of the statute through Supreme Court interpretations and
congressional amendments to support its narrow view. Finally, the
clinching argument was the rule of lenity, a canon of interpretation
concerned with avoiding unfair surprise and other consequences that
can result from reading a federal criminal statute too broadly)166
McNally would appear to be a wonderfully practical opinion, persua-
sively weaving together the various factors like threads in a cable-until
one looks at the evidence. The Court built its case, according to which
every one of the factors supports the Court's interpretation, by ignor-
ing or suppressing quite substantial evidence going the other way. For-
tunately, Justice Stevens, in dissent, assembled the evidence and used
the same practical reasoning factors to disassemble the Court's analy-
sis, factor by factor. 167 He noted, for example, that the text of the stat-
ute seems at war with the Court's interpretation. By interpreting "to
defraud" to include only deceptions involving money or property, the
Court seems to render the prohibition substantially duplicative of the
next clause, which criminalizes any scheme "for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises."' 68 While not an unyielding rule, the Court will try to inter-
pret a statute to avoid redundancy of separate statutory language. 169
This suggestive argument finds support in the meaning of the term "to
defraud." Contrary to the Court's opinion, the longstanding legal defi-
nition of "defraud" includes concealment of important information in a
fiduciary setting, and interpretations of other federal statutes have not
limited its scope to property fraud. 170 Here common sense coincides
with legal sense. When a public official takes a bribe, we the people are
"defrauded" just as though she were a realtor lying to us about the
drainage on a piece of property. We are deprived of the fiduciary's
honest service to us.
Nor is there a "smoking gun" in the historical evidence suggesting
that the 1872 Congress either specifically intended a narrower defini-
tion of "to defraud," or even gave any thought to the precise issue
165. Id. at 357 (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896)).
166. Id. at 360:
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambig-
uous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to
the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak
more clearly than it has.
167. Id. at 362-77 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
169. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2188-89
(1988). Of course, the next clause is duplicative under either interpretation of "defraud."
The overlap is more striking tinder the Court's interpretation.
170. McNally, 483 U.S. at 371-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (following United States v.
Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1987) (PosnerJ.)).
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before the Court.' 17 An imaginative reconstruction of what the 1872
Congress might have meant is no more helpful to the Court's interpre-
tation, because nineteenth century use of the term "to defraud"
reached actions seeking "to withhold from another that which is justly
due to him, or to deprive him of a right by deception or artifice."'
172
Moreover, one major statutory purpose conflicts with the Court's inter-
pretation. The Court has long recognized that a primary purpose of
the statute is "to protect the integrity of the United States mails by not
allowing them to be used 'as instruments of crime.' "173 To allow the
mails to be used to perpetrate fiduciary crimes, but not property
crimes, is to read into the statute a fiction unsupported by what might
be characterized as the main legislative purpose.
Some, but not all, of the evolutive factors cast doubt on the Court's
interpretation. The statute's development has been a steady expansion
of its ambit to reach new kinds of fraud, and Congress has neither re-
stricted these expansions, nor even expressed any reservations about
them. 174 Even the rule of lenity does not unequivocally support the
Court's result. While the rule does support the Court's reluctance to
give the mail fraud statute broad application, its force is undermined by
the longstanding interpretation that all lower courts have given, apply-
ing it to fiduciary frauds. Indeed, the obvious illegality of the conduct
to which the statute has been applied undermines the Court's interpre-
tation. A public official directing government contracts to a buddy in
return for extensive kickbacks (the facts of McNally) knows that the con-
duct is fraudulent and cannot claim "surprise" that a statute aimed at
fraud might be applied to such conduct.
When a wide variety of federal judges, faced with concrete examples
of illicit behavior by state officials, have uniformly filled an enforcement
vacuum by using a general federal criminal statute amenable to such an
interpretation, it strikes us as impractical for the Supreme Court to cut
off this statutory evolution root and branch. McNally seems wrong not
because the Court failed to invoke practical reasoning, but because the
Court applied the factors so mechanically and abstractly, without giving
a fair and balanced assessment of the evidence. The Court's opinion
violates the hermeneutical spirit, which impels the interpreter to em-
brace evidence running against her tentative views and to try to learn
from it, thereby reaching a more maturejudgment. Similarly, the opin-
ion breaches the central teaching of pragmatism, which emphasizes
"concreteness" and "facts," with an eye to "the open air and possibili-
ties of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretense of finality
171. Id. at 373-74.
172. 1 BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 530 (1897). This and a number of similar usages are
quoted injustice Stevens' dissent. McNally, 483 U.S. at 370-71.
173. 483 U.S. at 365-66. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 528
F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1975), and citing a number of similar cases).
174. Id. at 374.
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in truth."' 175 Put more bluntly, the Court's opinion in McNally hides the
ball. It seems implausible that the analysis in the Court's opinion per-
suaded even the seven Justices who joined it, and the Court missed an
excellent opportunity to ventilate the mail fraud statute with some can-
did discussion.
Faced with the unpersuasiveness of the Court's written opinion, the
hermeneutic interpreter would seek to retrieve the concrete facts or
ideas that must have moved the Justices in McNally. In our view, Mc-
Nally's core concern was to prevent limitless elasticity in the coverage of
a broadly phrased federal criminal statute. The mail fraud statute has
evolved through ever-expansive judicial interpretation, to reach both
new and old forms of fraud. This is on the whole commendable. The
further the statute has expanded, however, the more problematic that
expansion has become, for the statute presses against the rule of lenity,
seems to federalize areas traditionally left to the states, and risks selec-
tive, partisan enforcement of the statute (since a United States Attorney
appointed by the President is prosecuting a local or state political fig-
ure). The stakes for these concerns are indeed quite high, since mail
fraud statute violations can be predicate offenses justifying the poten-
tially harsh sanctions of the RICO statute. 176 Given these concerns,
and the step-by-step expansion of the statute in the lower courts, the
lesson to learn from McNally would be that we have to find a limiting
principle for this open-ended statute, which the judiciary has already
expanded so dramatically.
At first glance, one plausible limiting principle would seem to be the
one that the Court chose. Focusing on fraud involving property has
several advantages. It fits nicely with the original core concerns of the
1872 version of the statute, does not clearly contravene the Court's ear-
lier interpretations of the statute, and carves out of the statute many of
the most sensitive cases, such as those threatening state officials and
party bosses with prosecution for patronage by a United States Attor-
ney who belongs to a different political party. As the Court suggested,
it would be perfectly appropriate for Congress to expand the statute to
include these sensitive cases expressly, and indeed Congress effectively
did so a year later. 177 Having Congress rather than the Court broaden
the statute would open public debate of the issues and lend greater
legitimacy to the federal intrusion into state politics.
These are the considerations we think actually motivated the Jus-
tices in McNally. But we do not find even this articulated defense of the
Court's position wholly persuasive, because the open-ended statutory
175. W.JAMES, supra note 6, at 51.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982); see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988) ("the term 'scheme or arti-
fice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services").
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language invites judicial elaboration, and because there seems to be
little contemporary doubt that referral and kickback scams by state offi-
cials are squalid and "fraudulent" in any meaningful sense of the term.
Moreover, the Court could have trimmed the ambit of the mail fraud
statute in a number of other ways. For example, in United States v. Mar-
giotta, 178 an excellent dissenting opinion by Judge Ralph Winter raised
cogent objections to the Second Circuit's extension of officials' fiduci-
ary duty to include political bosses who hold no formal public office.
Judge Winter argued against this expansive reading of public fiduciary
duty, even while accepting that the statute covered intangible rights.
And since one of the defendants in McNally was a party leader with no
formal government post, the Court in McNally could have limited the
mail fraud statute in just this way, by exempting nonpublic officials who
allegedly violate the public trust. Had the Court crafted this narrower
limitation on the mail fraud statute, it would have stimulated public de-
bate that might have led Congress to amend the statute. But it would
not have removed the statute from a natural area for federal
regulation. '
7 9
The practical reasoning methodology we propose is more than a
multifactored, anti-foundationalist approach. Its distinctive features
are its focus on the concrete and avoidance of opinions that sweep
more broadly than necessary (unlike McNally), its willingness to ac-
knowledge indeterminacy and conflicting values rather than indulge in
makeweight arguments (unlike Weber), and its effort to engage in a dia-
lectic of interpretation (unlike either decision). This last point is per-
haps the most critical. Too often the Court's statutory interpretations
ignore opposing arguments or treat them in a dismissive, mechanical
fashion, typically in footnotes, and too rarely do they engage in an open
dialogue that notes the virtues of various positions and explains why
one of them is preferable. Such a dialogue would improve the quality
of the Court's opinions and provide more solid guidance for lower
courts, which must interpret the Court's opinions, and for Congress,
which might want to amend the statute in response to the Court's con-
cerns. It also might alter the results in some of the Court's most uncon-
vincing opinions, such as McNally.
B. External Critique of the Court's Reluctance to Admit the Importance of
Evolutive Factors
An important feature of our practical reasoning model is its focus
on evolutive factors, in addition to the more traditional textual and his-
178. 688 F.2d 108, 121-23 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
913 (1983).
179. Another way to limit the mail fraud statute would focus on the mail aspect of it, as
by requiring that the use of the mails (the federal trigger) be critical to the fraudulent scheme.
The Court has not chosen this path, however. See Schmuck v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1443
(1989).
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torical factors. If interpretation is a fusion of horizons, our current van-
tage point will always exercise some influence on the common ground
we reach with an historical text. Older statutes, especially when they
are generally phrased, may obviously require an imaginative process of
fusion with our more distant horizon. In these cases, the text and legis-
lative history will usually not be terribly helpful, and the Court will find
evolutive considerations the only way to mediate the temporal distance.
This is why evolutive factors were so important in Bob Jones, which inter-
preted a very old statute. But even recent statutes may involve a diffi-
cult process of interpretation under our model. Weber, for example,
interpreted a more recent statute, but one whose assumptions were un-
done in a very short time; although the statute in that case was only
fifteen years old, the fusion of horizons that Weber demanded was com-
paratively difficult. What is striking, and troubling, is that in all three
cases the Court was very reluctant to acknowledge the force of evolu-
tive considerations.180 And even when the Court does concede the im-
portance of evolutive factors, the concession is often made reluctantly,
even grudgingly. Consider the following case.
In Bryan v. Itasca County, 18' Minnesota sought to tax the personal
property of a Native American who lived on a federal Indian reserva-
tion. In general, longstanding precedent provides that, absent con-
gressional consent, state laws do not apply to reservation Indians
within the reservation.' 82 The issue in Bryan was whether federal Pub-
180. In none of the three cases did the Court clearly acknowledge the importance of
evolutive factors, though concurring opinions in Weber (by Justice Blackmun) and Bob Jones (by
Justice Powell) explicitly invoked evolutive factors as decisive for them. For other recent cases
where concurring opinions flesh out evolutive considerations suppressed by the Court's opin-
ions, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1796 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Mesa v. California, 109 S. Ct. 959, 970 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 2456 (1988) (Kennedy,J., concurring
in the judgment); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part); United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 677 (1988) (Blackmun,J., concur-
ring); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,495 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 636 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment); NLRB v. International Bd.
of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 596 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment);
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 383 (1987) (Blackmun,J., concurring in thejudgment);John-
son v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); California
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 487 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pattern Makers' League v.
NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 116 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
For recent cases where the Court ignored evolutive factors even while reaching results
consistent with (and surely influenced by) such arguments, see, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron,
109 S. Ct. 939 (1989); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414 (1988); Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Puerto
Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615
(1987); St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527
(1986); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
181. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
182. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Worces-
ter v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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lic Law 280183 authorized the state tax. Section 4(a) of this statute pro-
vided that several states, including Minnesota,
shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in [specified areas of Indian coun-
try] ... to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction
over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State...
that are of general application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State .... 184
The state seized upon the second clause of section 4(a) to support its
asserted power to tax. In addition, it noted that section 4(b) of the
statute expressly exempted from state taxation certain sorts of Native
American property, 18 5 but not the kind at issue in Bryan, thereby sug-
gesting by negative implication that the state tax was proper.
The unanimous Court disagreed with this strong textualist argu-
ment, essentially holding that other interpretive factors outweighed the
apparent meaning of the statutory text. Public Law 280, the Court con-
cluded, had been adopted almost entirely because, under the statute's
other provisions, certain states received criminal jurisdiction over Na-
tive American territory. Congress added the civil jurisdictional provi-
sion at issue in Bryan largely as an afterthought. The legislative history
failed to reflect any consideration of whether it was intended generally
to extend state legislative authority-as opposed to state civil court ju-
risdiction-into Native American territory. The Court invoked the
longstanding canon of interpretation that federal statutes will not be
interpreted to diminish tribal sovereignty absent a clear statement to
that effect in statutory language or legislative history. ' 8 6 This canon-a
judicial policy judgment intended to preserve tribal sovereignty unless
the contrary outcome is congressionally compelled-trumped the gen-
eral language of the civil jurisdictional provision, since the state had not
shown a specific congressional intention to extend its legislative power.
Only at the end of its opinion did the Court more directly acknowl-
183. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 589 (1953) (codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1982)).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982).
185.
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation
of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or
any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall au-
thorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;
or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or
otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest
therein.
28 U.S.C, § 1360(b) (1982).
186. On such canons of construction, see generally Charles F. Wilkinson & John M.
Volkman,Judidal Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "'As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon
the Earth "--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (1975).
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edge the evolutive sources of its interpretation. It noted that Congress
had adopted Public Law 280 during an era in which the federal policy
was to force assimilation of Native Americans, but that Congress had
abandoned that policy in short order. An extension of state legislative
power over Native American territory, the Court reasoned, might be
devastating to the tribes.' 8 7 For all these reasons, the Court inter-
preted the second clause of section 4(a) as simply authorizing state
courts to apply their own rules of decision, and not those found in tri-
bal law, to the civil cases over which they were granted jurisdiction.
Bryan is a useful illustration of the way in which evolutive considera-
tions are often the decisive ones in statutory interpretation. On the
face of the statute, Minnesota probably had the better argument.'88
There was apparently nothing very specific in the legislative history, but
if the enacting Congress had been asked about the Bryan issue while it
was considering Public Law 280, one would guess that the answer
would have supported Minnesota as well. Indeed, it would be difficult
to find a Congress in this century that seemed more clearly animated by
the desire to destroy tribal sovereignty. For in addition to enacting
Public Law 280, the 1953 Congress adopted a concurrent resolution
that created the federal policy of terminating the unique federal legal
status-and thus the sovereignty-of Native American tribes. 89  A
legal-process purpose inquiry might also support Minnesota, since the
purpose of Public Law 280 was to extend state authority over certain
187. The Court quoted with approval the view of the Ninth Circuit that courts "'are not
obliged in ambiguous instances to strain to implement [an assimilationist] policy Congress
has now rejected, particularly where to do so will interfere with the present congressional
approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship.' " Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388 n.14 (quoting
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)) (brackets in
original).
188. If read in isolation, the second clause in § 4(a) of Public Law 280, which deals with
state laws of general application, seems to support Minnesota's argument that its taxing stat-
utes reached Indian country. When read within the context and structure of the rest of§ 4(a),
however, that interpretation loses some of its force. This is so because the preceding clause
of § 4(a) simply grants state courts civil jurisdiction over cases arising in Indian country, and
when both clauses are read together the second one can be plausibly interpreted the way the
Court did in Bryan-as providing simply that state law rules of decision, not tribal law rules of
decision, govern the cases over which state court jurisdiction is granted by the first clause.
Indeed, the two clauses of § 4(a) are linked by the conjunction "and" into one sentence,
fortifying the Court's interpretation that the seemingly broad language of the second clause
must be seen through the narrowing lens of the first clause. Cutting against this approach,
however, is the language of § 4(b), which is quoted in note 185 supra. Section 4(b) carves out
some exceptions to the grant of state power provided by § 4(a), and several of these excep-
tions seem to contemplate that state legislative power controls in Indian country unless other-
wise excepted. This argument based on the negative implications of § 4(b) is another
example of the expressio unius maxim-that the expression of some exceptions implies that the
legislature intended those to be the only exceptions. This maxim is ordinarily a weak reed
upon which to base an interpretation, because it is based on the faulty assumption of legisla-
tive omniscience. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 641-42. It is often rejected
by courts, as Holy Trinity Church exemplifies. Nonetheless, on the face of §§ 4(a) and (b),
Minnesota probably had the stronger argument in Bryan.
189. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
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tribal Indians. 190 These legislative intentions and purposes, however,
became obsolete within about five years. By the time Bryan made its
way to the Supreme Court, the firmly established federal policy was to
promote tribal sovereignty.' 91
The Court is rarely as forthright in considering evolutive factors as
it was in Bryan. But while we believe the case was correctly decided,
even the Bryan opinion is hardly as candid as it might have been. For
example, Bryan essentially ignores the statutory language, which does
cut against its interpretation. Rather than admit that the language must
be weighed otherwise, the Court simply announced that its apparent
thrust "is foreclosed by the legislative history... and the application of
canons of construction."1 92 Yet the legislative history itself is murky,
and the Court did not openly grapple with the reasons for ignoring
apparent textual meaning. While the Court recognized that evolutive
factors weighed heavily against the assertion of state taxing authority, it
buried most of this discussion in a footnote. 193 The opinion ends with
the somewhat doubtful assertion that because Congress knows that the
Court will require a clear statement before it interprets a statute to di-
minish tribal sovereignty,' 94 Congress's failure to write the statute in a
crystal-clear manner suggests that it must have intended the result
reached in Bryan. Astonishingly, the opinion places the responsibility
for the result upon a long-adjourned Congress that surely gave no
thought at all to the issue, rather than upon the Court itself, which cre-
ated the controlling interpretive presumption and reached a result very
much at odds with whatever original intentions could probably be
reconstructed.
Typically, the failure of the Court to acknowledge the force of
evolutive factors is simply a failure of candor, since it is apparent that
the Court or at least some of the Justices have considered those factors
seriously.' 95 In other cases, however, this failure may affect the result.
Consider our last example, United States v. Kozminski.' 96 Section 1584 of
the Criminal Code makes it a federal crime knowingly and willfully to
190. Like most purpose inquiries, however, this one is quite indeterminate. Minnesota
would point to a broad purpose of assimilating the affected bands of tribal Indians; the tribes
would respond that the narrow purpose of Public Law 280 was to provide criminal enforce-
ment and a forum for civil adjudication in several states where Congress deemed the tribal
justice system inadequate. Yet even this narrower purpose might suggest that Minnesota
should have the power to tax Indian property, thereby raising revenue to offset the state's
expenses incurred in providing the criminal enforcement and judicial forums required of it by
Public Law 280.
191. The policy of coerced termination lost force by 1958. Both candidates in the 1960
presidential campaign supported abandoning the termination policy. Since 1961 tribal self-
determination, not termination, has been the dominant federal policy. See generally HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 180-206 (R. Strickland 2d ed. 1982).
192. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 379.
193. Id. at 388 n.14.
194. Id. at 392-93.
195. See note 180 supra.
196. 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988).
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hold another person "to involuntary servitude." 197 The issue in the
case was whether the statute prohibits servitude induced by psychologi-
cal pressure, as well as by physical or legal threats. A majority of the
Court held that it does not.
The Court's opinion closely tracks our practical reasoning model,
emphasizing the historical factors. To begin with, the Court found the
textual prohibition of "involuntary servitude" to be based upon, and
certainly parallel to, the similar prohibition in the thirteenth amend-
ment. When section 1584 was added to the Criminal Code in 1948, all
of the Court's thirteenth amendment opinions "involved compulsion of
services through the use or threatened use of physical or legal coer-
cion." 198 Moreover, the Court found the specific legislative history of
the statute aimed most directly at traditional means of enslavement,
namely physical or legal coercion, and concluded that the broader in-
terpretation sought by the Government would take the statute too far
beyond its original purposes. 199
The Court also gave explicit consideration to evolutive factors, but
found them insufficient to justify expanding the original intent and pur-
pose of section 1584. The Government and four Justices who con-
curred only in the judgment urged that the Court develop standards by
which psychological coercion could be a basis for conviction under the
statute. 200 The Court declined that opportunity, on rule of lenity
grounds: No sufficiently "objective" test could be devised that would
give proper notice to defendants as to what conduct might be illegal,
and that would place needed restraints on prosecutorial and jury
discretion.2
0 '
We find the Court's opinion in Kozminski to be a good example of
our practical reasoning model in operation, and on the whole we be-
lieve the Court was candid and reasonable in its consideration of all the
evidence. The Court's analysis does not sufficiently consider current
fairness, however. Nor does it adequately consider the fact that the text
of the statute is open-ended. While an interpretation of the statute per-
mitting conviction for psychologically inducing a victim into virtual ser-
vitude probably would, as the Court indicates, expand the statute
beyond its drafters' expectations, by criminalizing "involuntary servi-
tude" without any elaboration or definition, Congress was delegating
to the Court the articulation of standards. 20 2 The Court's definition,
which excludes any kind of "psychological" coercion from the term "in-
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1982) authorizes criminal punishment of "[w~hoever knowingly
and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servi-
tude, any other person for any term."
198. 108 S. Ct. at 2761 (citing cases).
199. Id. at 2761-63.
200. Id. at 2763 (describing Government's position); id. at 2765-69 (Brennan,J., concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 2771-74 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
201. Id. at 2764-65.
202. Id. at 2772-73 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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voluntary," seems almost a contradiction in terms. Surely the open tex-
ture of the statute allows, indeed invites, the Court to find criminal
liability in some cases where the coercion is psychological.
The Court's response is that any test of psychological coercion
would be too vague. Given the rule of lenity concerns, this might seem
persuasive, as an abstract matter. But one weakness of the Court's per
se approach is that it requires the case to be considered as an abstract
matter. The facts of the case, by contrast, are ideal for a limited expan-
sion of the statute's scope. The victims in the case were two men over
60 years old but with mental ages of eight to ten years. The defendants
allegedly brought the victims to their farm and used various psycholog-
ical measures-including denial of pay, subjection to substandard living
conditions, isolation from others, lies, third party pressure, and verbal
abuse-to induce the victims to stay. The Government also presented
evidence of physical or legal threats, but the core of its case was the
psychological coercion. While psychological pressure goes well beyond
the core abuses against which section 1584 was originally directed, our
current understanding of its power makes it anomalous to say that psy-
chological coercion is less abusive than physical or legal coercion that
admittedly violates the statute. 20
3
Kozminski, we repeat, is a thoughtful opinion that reflects the Court
at its best. Yet the case demonstrates the Court's typical reluctance to
follow evolutive considerations when they cut against historical evi-
dence, even in a classic instance where historical concerns ought to
yield to evolutive ones. The text of the statute interpreted in Kozminski
invites judicial development of the statute on a case-by-case basis, and
the historical evidence is highly general, with no smoking gun in the
legislative history suggesting that Congress thought about the precise
issue and reached any kind of binding consensus. The evolutive con-
cerns are very strong if, as we suspect, the coercive force of psychologi-
cal pressure is better understood today than when the statute was
enacted. In this respect, Kozminski seems similar to Bryan, where the
Court reached the evolutive result, and somewhat stronger than Weber,
where the Court reached the evolutive result in the teeth of strongly
contrary historical evidence.
Practical reason suggests that the Court ought to be candid about
the influence of evolutive considerations, unlike the waffling opinion in
Bryan, and ought not to trump up makeweight historical or textual ar-
guments when the primary grounds for the opinion are evolutive, as
the Court did in Weber and Bob Jones. Furthermore, practical reason
suggests that where statutory language is open-textured and Congress
seems not to have deliberated about a specific issue, the Court ought to
203. Justice Brennan's opinion concurring in the judgment briefly alluded to cases in
which lower courts had found slavelike conditions that resulted from psychological coercion.
See id. at 2767.
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follow decisive evolutive considerations. This, indeed, is what statutory
interpretation is ultimately all about-the case-by-case evolution of the
statute to meet new problems and societal circumstances, and to meet
new understandings of those problems and circumstances. The history
that should drive statutory interpretation is not just the original expec-
tations surrounding the statute, but also the ongoing historical devel-
opment of the statute as those historical expectations and policies are
applied in new and unanticipated factual settings.
C. Practical Reasoning in Statutory Interpretation: Working Beyond the
Counter-Majoritarian Anxiety
Many of the criticisms we have raised in this part of the article relate
to the style of the Supreme Court's decisions-namely, their one-sided-
ness and their reluctance to credit persuasive evolutive considerations.
Several commentators attribute these weaknesses to the fact that law
clerks and not the Justices actually draft many opinions. 20 4 Thus even
if the Justices actually decide cases by what we call "practical reason-
ing," it may be difficult to translate that reasoning into a written opin-
ion, particularly for less experienced third persons such as law
clerks. 20
5
A deeper and more troubling reason why the Court's opinions often
fail to reflect the actual weighing of interpretive factors is the Court's
reluctance to admit that it-and not the Congress-makes the decision
about statutory meaning in a difficult case. This "counter-majoritarian
anxiety" arises from the view that statutory law derives its legitimacy
from its enactment by Congress, which is elected by and accountable to
the people. Hence, when the Court interprets statutes, it must some-
how link its interpretation with the expectations of the democratically
elected body. The Court does this by relying upon "objective" evi-
dence that ties its interpretation to the text of the statute, the original
expectations of Congress, or both. Indeed, the Court sometimes makes
quite a show of preventing its "subjective" preferences from influenc-
ing statutory interpretation.20 6
204. See R. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 13, at 102-29; Joseph Vining, Justice,
Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MicH. L. REV. 248, 251-52 (1981).
205. It is by now perhaps a clich6 that law schools typically teach budding law clerks
little that is useful about statutory interpretation. See, e.g., R. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, Supra
note 13, at 336-40.
206. Typical rhetoric by the Court emphasizes that it will only make law "interstitially,"
where Congress has not "clearly" acted. "Judicial perception that a particular result would be
unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify
disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally provided." Commissioner v. Asphalt
Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987) (per curiam). Though the Court hides behind this sort
of rhetoric, its opinions-by both conservatives and liberals-routinely violate it. For the
1986 and 1987 Terms alone, see, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510
(1988) (Scalia, J.); id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2528 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988) (Marshall, J.); id. at 1677
(Stevens,J., dissenting); United States Dep't ofJustice v.Julian, 108 S. Ct. 1606 (1988) (Rehn-
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The Court's anxiety over its creative lawmaking role has often
drawn cynical responses. The legal realists, for example, felt the Court
was playing a clever game of three-card monte with Congress and the
public, masking its lawmaking decisions behind the screen of neutral
principles and determinate texts. 20 7 Our assumptions are substantially
less cynical. We believe that the Court feels torn by this counter-
majoritarian anxiety. The Justices realize that the hard cases are diffi-
cult and must often be resolved by consulting evolutive considerations,
but they are reluctant to admit openly that they are making judgment
calls that bear an uncertain relation to legislative texts and intentions.
Such judgment calls, especially when based upon debatable evidence,
current concerns, and judicially created policies, seem "subjective,"
and smack of judicial policymaking that displaces majoritarian govern-
ment. To avoid the charge of subjectivity, the Justices feel a strong pull
toward justifying their decisions by reference to "objective" evidence-
text, legislative intentions, even statutory purposes-that is the evident
product of majoritarian preferences. 2
08
This analysis suggests that the appeal of foundationalism is deep
indeed, for the leading foundationalist theories-textualism, intention-
alism, and purposivism-are means by which the Court can seemingly
reassure itself and the body politic that its statutory interpretation deci-
sions represent an "objectively" apparent loyalty to democratic values,
and not the Court's "subjective" preferences or value judgments. As
we have seen, this reassurance is false, for several reasons. First, the
link between foundationalist theories of interpretation and majoritarian
political preference is tenuous, because the assumptions linking each
method to majoritarianism are questionable. Second, the indetermi-
nacy of each of those theories in the hard cases suggests that none of
the theories can by itself "objectively" predict what a reasonable Court
will do. And the indeterminacy of each theory subverts its claim to con-
strain the Court; as JVeber suggests, the same Justices can look at the
same textual and historical evidence and come up with vastly different
interpretations of the statute. Third, none of the traditional theories
can convincingly exclude evolutive factors from influencing decisions.
Especially where the evolutive evidence is derived from more recent
congressional action on related subjects-in Bob Jones, for example, the
influence of modern civil rights legislation on tax preferences for segre-
quist, C.J.); id. at 1614 (ScaliaJ., dissenting); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351
(1988) (Brennan,J.); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) (Powell, J.); id. at 53 (Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
207. See K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
"Three-card monte, like the shell-game, depends on the undoubted fact that the practiced
hand is quicker than the unpracticed eye. A major technique is the diversion of attention ....
I have elsewhere expressed my belief that until the prevailing theory of case-law is reformed,
judicial card sharping is the part of wisdom, decency, and duty." Id. at 17 n.29.
208. A classic statement of this anxiety in constitutional lawmaking is Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971).
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gated schools-legislative supremacy does not require the Court to ig-
nore evolutive considerations in its decisions.
Pragmatism and hermeneutics have inspired our criticisms of statu-
tory foundationalism. They also suggest therapies for the counter-
majoritarian anxiety. At the most general level, one insight of these
philosophical theories is that the quest for objective foundations of
knowledge is illusory, and that the failure of that quest does not con-
sign us to nihilism or ad hoc relativism. As Richard Bernstein has put
it, the goal of much modern thought is to take us "beyond objectivism
and relativism. ' 20 9 Thus, he argues that the foundationalist urge in
philosophy, though understandable, is the product of a longstanding
thirst for philosophical certainty that is illusory. Earlier science, philos-
ophy, and social science shared the belief that we can make progress
only by identifying the correct foundationalist method and carefully ap-
plying its precepts. In each of these disciplines, the foundationalist
faith has been shattered in this century by thinkers who have demon-
strated the situatedness and historical particularity of much accepted
foundational theory.210 Much as we traced the epistemological difficul-
ties with the leading foundationalist theories of statutory interpreta-
tion, scientists and philosophers have criticized the foundationalist
urge in their disciplines. The apparent failure of foundationalism
21 l
has led some to embrace simple relativism or nihilism. This too has not
been satisfactory. And whatever the problems of relativism in science
or philosophy, they are even more troubling in legal theory, where, be-
cause of the clear link between law and political power, arbitrariness is
most to be feared. 2 12
The slide into relativism, however, is not a necessary consequence
of rejecting foundationalism. A second lesson of modem pragmatism
is that the opposition between objectivism and relativism is false. To
deny that there is any single objective grounding for knowledge is not
necessarily to assert that knowledge is impossible or purely relative;
a middle position in the debate questions the tendency of both ob-
jectivists and relativists to assume that "real" knowledge, if it exists,
must rest on unquestionable foundations. In philosophy, modem
pragmatists argue that the paradigm for rationality is no longer that of
209. See R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM, supra note 8; R. BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
PROFILES, supra note 8; see also R. RORTY, supra note 2; R. RORTY, supra note 7.
210. Leading works include H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5 (philoso-
phy); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (science);
PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE (1958) (social science). These works and their
implications are discussed in R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM, supra note 8, at 30-44.
211. The critique of foundationalism by works cited in note 210 supra is, of course, not
universally accepted. Many philosophers, particularly in English-speaking countries, still op-
erate under more or less foundationalist assumptions.
212. "[T]he desire for a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint-a desire to find
'foundations' to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects
which impose themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid." R. RORTY, supra note 2,
at 315.
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the isolated thinker rigorously proceeding by the one true method from
unquestionable premises, but instead is intersubjective. As interlocu-
tors seeking to reach agreement on an interpretation, we discuss the
text from various perspectives, employ analogies and arguments, and
self-consciously confront the limits of our own perspective. Over time
the hermeneutical discourse develops traditions that constrain the sorts
of arguments that can be made, and new discourses build upon the
agreements reached in prior discourses. The interlocutors do not
claim that what they decide is "true" in any foundational sense, but
they do seek agreement that is useful, or workable, or satisfies whatever
other practical criteria seem applicable. 21
3
This debate in modem philosophy, therefore, is explicitly con-
nected to the legal question: What is the nature of interpretation? 214
An important lesson that hermeneutics suggests for lawyers is that stat-
utory interpretation is not simply a matter of retrieving the original
meaning from a historical text. Rather, the interpreter inevitably un-
derstands the text from her own historical perspective, and must take
account of the relation between legal text and social circumstances.
Gadamer's "fusing of horizons" metaphor captures this process: The
historical text speaks to the present-day interpreter, who learns from
the text and responds to it. The interpretation is the common ground
reached in this interaction-a common ground that did not preexist the
interaction. Gadamer denies, therefore, that the text has a predeter-
mined meaning, because meaning comes only through this application
of the text-for our purposes, a statute-to a particular situation-the
case.
Thus, when Congress enacts a statute and empowers an agency, the
courts, or both to "interpret" the statute, it sends its historically situ-
ated text off on a dynamic enterprise. There is no way around that. If
Congress wants to minimize judicial evolution of its statutes, it has
many strategies at its disposal: writing detailed statutes and amending
them frequently; "sunsetting," or providing expiration dates for stat-
utes; or delegating issues to an agency Congress thinks it can control.
These strategies are reasonable, but so is the strategy of leaving diffi-
cult interpretive issues to judicial development over time. Contrary to
foundationalist ideology, most political participants and observers both
realize that judicial interpretations of statutes cannot be rigorously de-
fended under majoritarian assumptions and are not troubled by this
213. For a related effort to deflate the apparent dichotomy between objectivism and rel-
ativism in constitutional adjudication, see Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason, supra note 3, at
1652-56.
214. Indeed, Gadamer approaches philosophy from a distinctly interpretivist perspec-
tive and takes judicial interpretation of statutes as the paradigm of interpretation generally.
See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 5, at 88-104; see also R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND
OBJEcriViSM, supra note 8.
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fact, probably because Congress is considerably more pragmatic than
some of the legal scholars who comment on its work.
Hermeneutics offers one final, reassuring lesson for statutory inter-
pretation. Although interpretation is neither objective nor predictable,
it is bounded. Unlike the elected Congress, nonelected Justices are
tightly constrained if hermeneutics is right about the nature of interpre-
tation. The historical text itself constrains, for the interpreter is
charged with learning from the text and working from it to the current
problem. Moreover, the interpreter's perspective itself is conditioned
by tradition-the evolution of the historical text as it has been inter-
preted, the values of society, and current circumstances. While these
constraints certainly do not dictate a result, the interpreter cannot dis-
regard the force of that which envelops and situates her in present soci-
ety. Thus, the hermeneutical attitude charges the interpreter with a
moral duty to give herself over to the dialogue, the to and fro play, with
the historical text; to learn from the text, respond to the text, and reach
common ground with the text. Whatever this may be, it is nothing so
banal as subjectivism, nor is it so illusory as objectivism.
Consider these hermeneutical constraints in practice. In the easy
cases, where the text, its history, and subsequent evolution speak in
pretty much one direction, interpreters from a wide range of back-
grounds and values can agree on an interpretation, as the Court did in
Griffin. This agreement can also come in harder cases, such as Holy
Trinity Church, where the interpreter must work beyond the apparent
plain meaning of the text. Even in the hardest cases, it is striking how
much common ground differently situated interpreters can find, if they
genuinely throw themselves into the interpretive process.
Recall Kozminski, in which the Court seemed to splinter over the
meaning of "involuntary servitude." Even in that case, the Court was
unanimous that the convictions had to be vacated, because all nine Jus-
tices agreed that the instructions on psychological coercion were too
broad. And all nine Justices believed that on retrial the victims' psycho-
logical vulnerability would be highly relevant to the jury's considera-
tion. Although we agree with the specially concurring Justices that
greater latitude should have been given to psychological evidence, we
do not consider the Court's position to be so distant from our own.
Indeed, the Court's opinion makes a considerable effort to acknowl-
edge our concerns. That such a heterogenous Court could reach
agreement on so much in Kozminski is itself noteworthy, and we believe
that this is due to the practical reasoning and dialectical process in
which all the opinions engaged in this instance.
The Court has been more truly fractured in the Weber line of cases,
and a significant minority thinks Weber should be overruled. Here the
different perspectives of the Justices make a considerable difference,
and it may be that the high public visibility of the issue draws the inter-
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preters away from their hermeneutical enterprise. This does not
trouble us, because the Weber issue is one on which a single discussion
is not going to suggest conclusive answers. Instead, the Weber issue will
remain with the Court over time, and the continuing stream of affirma-
tive action cases will test the strength of the practical reasoning in that
case. Our hunch is that for the time being affirmative action in the
workplace is workable, but in the 1990s will be subjected to greater
limitations than those imposed by Weber. After that, affirmative action
may be less necessary (if it has worked) or may be reconsidered (if it
hasn't).
CONCLUSION
Considering our critical tone throughout this article, it may seem
surprising that we are ending on a somewhat optimistic note. We do
believe that the Court's approach to resolving issues of statutory inter-
pretation is largely grounded in practical reasoning, and thus that the
Court's technique is consistent with other twentieth century trends,
such as pragmatism. To be sure, the Court could substantially improve
its performance if it more candidly reflected this reasoning process in
its opinions. The Court ought to acknowledge that, standing alone,
textualist and archeological approaches to statutory interpretation are
overly simplistic techniques that provide only a chimera of the legiti-
macy the Court seeks. In contrast, by bringing all the relevant factors
and all of our problem-solving skills to bear on difficult questions of
statutory meaning in concrete situations, practical reasoning legiti-
mates statutory interpretation through deliberation and candor. The
legitimation is by no means ironclad, and in particular instances even
sensitive efforts in practical reasoning may misfire, as in Kozminski. But,
as in Kozminski, a candid explication of the reasoning process promises
to narrow and highlight the elements in dispute and fosters a delibera-
tive dialogue about statutory meaning in a concrete circumstance.
In the last analysis, statutory interpretation is neither mechanical
foundationalism nor unbounded, unpredictable, and unprincipled deci-
sionmaking. It is, therefore, fundamentally similar to judicial lawmak-
ing in the areas of constitutional law and common law. In each area of
judicial decisionmaking, deliberation and candor are necessary but not
sufficient conditions for legitimating outcomes. For, as Richard Bern-
stein has noted, practical reasoning "presuppose[s] the existence of a
sense of community and solidarity. ' 215 Even many of those who agree
with us that dialogical practical reason might perform a substantial le-
gitimating role may question whether there is an American legal inter-
pretive community in which such a communal dialogue may flourish, or
whether the interpretive community should be limited to the legal com-
215. R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECrIVISM, supra note 8, at 230.
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munity. 2 16 We find much to commend about this point of view, and
our descriptive model offers a framework for making this criticism.
That is, if statutory interpretation is a fusion of horizons-those of the
past text and the present interpreter-it makes a difference who the
interpreter is. If judges are inevitably making political choices, their
own political preunderstandings will make a difference in at least some
cases, especially those where there is no political consensus.
One answer to this challenge that hermeneutics and modem prag-
matism suggest is the potentially reconstructive nature of interpreta-
tion.2 17 Even without apparent consensus in society or in the legal
community, the interpreter can often create some kind of agreement in
the context of the narrow case, and through the case enlighten attitudes
in the larger community. While we disagree with the results the
Supreme Court has reached in a range of cases (such as Kozminski and
McNally), we have usually been impressed with the ability of most Jus-
tices to rise above their personal prejudgments. Legislative history,
precedent, reasoned commentary, and other constraining factors do
not completely close off avenues of judicial discretion, but the Justices
do seem to learn from those links between past and present and often
are able to apply those lessons to solve concrete cases in narrow, practi-
cal ways. In turn, these decisions teach the legal interpretive commu-
nity something about the dynamic nature of statutes and the process of
interpretation itself. That the dialogue between Court and community
is imperfect is not so much a reason to reject the dialogic enterprise as
it is to describe its shortcomings and expand its possibilities.
216. For a forceful argument that the necessary community does not exist, see MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, & BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63-64 (1988).
For a thoughtful analysis and rejoinder, see Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1418, 1428-37 (1989) (reviewing M. TUSHNET, supra).
217. See Richard J. Bernstein, From Hernieneutics to Praxis, in HERMENEUTICS AND PRAxIS
273, 287-90 (R. Hollinger ed. 1985).
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